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ABSTRACT 
Thin paper m i l examine some aspects o.f capitalist development 
in Kenya before 1945. The role of the state will be evaluated in the context 
of opposing interests those of local and foreign capitalists, respectively® 
The paper endeavours to illustrate the process of domestic accumulation of 
capital that ran parallel with investment from metropolitan firms in the 
colony. The areas and typos of investment are explored and a comparison 
is implicit in the arguement with the present stage of inligenoue capital 
accumulation. The analysis concludes with some detailed case studies on 
particular foreign companies that entered Kenya before 1945, where the aim 
is to show in some detail the competitive relations of capitalist production 
when applied to*-the control of a particular commodities? for instance, tea. 
The theme throughout this discussion is competition of capitals, a mechanism 
which was the driving force behind both the expansion ot foreign firms into 
the region "s well as the "bsomtion bv thesf for<^ipn como^nios of loc^l 
c-pit-1. 
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Introduction 
In '('extern 'Uurope and \meric in the late nineteenth century and 
cirly twentieth century there was enormous growth of industry an' a rapid 
concentration of pro 'uction in evor 1 U'gor enterprises - which was a charac-
teristic feature of advanced capitalism. Thin new stage of capitalism was 
m irked by the increasing size of enterprises and the formation of cartels 
/ind monopolies which attempted to control particular branches of production." 
The emergence of these monopoly forms of capitalism did not, however, 
preclude the laws of capitalist competition. 
Capitalism in this concentrated form sought to expand to areas where it could 
realise a higher rate of profit. The establishment of administrative control 
over Ugano . and Kenya at the end of the nineteenth century by the British, 
was in response to pressure from British merchant capital to increase control 
over supplies of agricultural commodities. 
It is important from the outlet of our analysis to establish a 
distinction between merchant and. in' ustri.il capital, and. to explain their 
interdependence • Merchant capital derive;-; its surplus product from engaging 
in unequal exch age, io. selling a particular commodity at a price higher 
thin its valur. Merchant capital is the intermediate step of transformation 
from money capital to productive capit 1. The accumulation of merchant 
capital reouires. the expansion of commodity production which has.the effect 
2 
of disrupting pre—capitalist modes of production. In East Africa in the 
first half of the twentieth century, this form of accumulation of merchant 
capital is evident. 
On a global level, by the beginning of the twentieth century the 
profits to merchant capital hit begun to dwinHe due to the concentration 
of production in resoonee to competition, and it was increasingly forced to 
3 give up its1 independent' role and act as an agent of industrial capital. 
1. V.I„ Lenin, Imperialism, the 'lighcst Stage of Capitalism , 
(Progress Press, Moscow, 1968}, pp. 14-27° 
2. For a fuller exposition•of these points sees G. Kay, Development 
and Underdevelopment 1 rxist \nilysis, (Facmillan Press, London, 1975), 
Chapter five. 
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Due to the intensely competitive conditions for merchant capital which was 
to culminate in the collapse of primary commodity prices during the depression, 
it was forced into the sphere of production. By the enc of World War Two 
industrial capital was prompted to invest directly in production in the 
developing areas. 
In this paper, the intention will be to examine the development of 
capit ilism in one colonial area: Kenya, with an emphasis on the competition 
between capitals which occurs at all levels of accumulation, both merchant 
and industrial. However, in Kenya, unlike in many other British colonies, 
surplus from capitalist production was not the exclusive domain of the metro-
politan bourgeoisie, but was shared between this class and. the local settler 
class. Therefore, the focus of this study will not only be on the efforts 
of British based cartels to control the conditions of production in Kenya, but 
on the relationship between local and foreign capitals. 
To begin with, the role of the state is evaluated in the context 
of the opposing interests of local and foreign capital. It is important 
to draw a constant distinction between the local administration and the metro-
politan government in support of their respective interests. The next part 
illustrates the process of domestic accumulation in the colony which ran 
parallel with investment from British conglomerates. By analysing capitalist 
growth from the perspective of company formations it is possible to examine 
all types of enterprise from agriculture to manufacturing and to assess their 
relative importance. The areas and type of investment of these local firms 
is explored and 1 comparison is implicit with the present stage of indigenous 
capital iccumul ition. The section on trading outlines Britain's trading 
position in East Africa and the competition between the different national 
merchant capitals which ultimately necessitated their move into production 
after the war. 
The section on the role of international capital reveals the nature 
and extent of foreign investment in different branches of trade and production 
in Kenya before 1945 o In each area of accumulation, an attempt has been 
made to show the point at which merchant capital finds itself compelled to 
convert to industrial capital after the Second World War. This part is 
concluded by throe case studdes on particular foreign companies which entered 
Kenya before 1945, each in a different sphere of activity. The aim here is 
to show in more detail the competitive relations of capitalist production whe 
applied to the control of certain commodities such as tea and: soda ash. 
In both these commodities a near monopoly was finally established by forei 
industrial firms over the Kenyan sou ce of production. 
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Part 1. TIE tqlD 0" "-TiT'-;. 
East \fric frora the 1 t • 19th century was linked to world market 
forces through British Colonialism,, the time of the advent of British 
administrative control of vdiese territories the area had limited indigenous 
markets is well as poor communications, an' was later to be settled by a 
sm:ll group of 'iuropoan farmers whose interests were distinct from and often 
opposed to those of British c .pit 1. It is within the context of these 
opposing interests that we will examine the role of the state, ' both central 
and local, in capitalist development before 1945° 
^rcm the outset of British auninistrative control of the three 
East African territories, there emerged a policy of simple primary production 
by metropolitan capital,. Colonial development in Africa in the 1920's was 
designed to increase the the supply of raw materials to British industry and 
at the same time to encourange the growth ox 'oapiive* markets in the colonies 
for British manufactured goo us. Therefore, when it came to providing loan 
capital for development in these colonies the central British administration 
was loath to supply this finance. Jowever, in response to the interests 
of the local settler diss, the colonial bureaucrats in East Africa encouraged 
5 
a policy of infrastructural development. The fin moo for- nnoh developments 
in the late 19th <n 1 early, 20th century was provided by the central guTuinmo„t, 
through 'Grants in Aid», which wore designed to promote such infrastructure 
as roads md railways thit would, f icilitato the extraction of primary products 
Colonial records regarding government policy on industrialisation 
are scant for the pre- Second 'ForId; Tar period, which to some extent limits 
the analysis. 
5. In general, the colonial government before the war backed the 
settler interests, see for a fuller exposition of this points "„ McGregor 
loss, Kenya from •flthin, Revised edition, (Frank Cases, 196C.) 
6. By 1936 the total of such grants in aid to British territories 
in Africa had only reached £27,000s Lord TT»M. Bailey, An African Survey, 
( Revised edition, Oxford University Press, 1956, p. 1323'). 
Grants in aid after 1929 were administered under the first Colonial Develop-
ment 'Act, which had been put forward mainly as a means to help solve 
Britain's unemployment problem, and was therefore designed to provide funds 
which would in the first place service the interest on loans raised by 
colonial governments giving contracts to British firms. In fact, economic 
repression prevented colonial governments from raising loans, hence the 
low figure for 1936 quoted ibove. 
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from the interior. By the end of the 1920s, government investment in 
infrastructure in Diot Africa had been considerable5 for instance almost 
1300milcs of new railway trick were opened, with a corresponding expansion 
in rolling 3tock and five deep water berths were built at Mombasa between 
1920 and 1932.7 
Indeed the Colonial Development Act of 1929 had placed emphasis 
on the construction of railways an promotion of trade and commerce with 
Britain, Thus, in addition to the grants in aid to insolvent colonies from 
1929, the central government decided to make available free grants or loans 
of up to £lm per annum for all British colonies, with relief on interest 
charges- The scheme took for granted that a large amount of expenditure 
would be generated by colonial economies themselves through the export of 
primary produce. But the instability of world commodity markets, on which 
colonial economies largely-relied, caused a cut back in revenue after 1929, 
despite the surplus generated between 1925-1929, After 1930 a policy of 
'retrenchment' was followed by the central government, "Sxisting services 
were to bo cut back, an! once budgets had been balanced, all administrations 
were expected to buil1 up 1 irge surplus balances to remove finall;/ the need 
for British grants of whatever kind. These programmes of retrenchment in 
the Sant African colonies, as well as some poorer colonies, totally ruled 
out the use of the CDA concessions for new projects of any kind.^ The 
following table shows how negligible was the effect of CDA to East Africa. 
Table 1 - Allocations to na from th. Colonial Development Fund 
Yoar Keny. 1 Tanganyika Uganda 
1929/30 0 0 112 0 
1930/31 67 a 13 
1931/32 -14 63 0 (£'000's) 
1932/33 11 17 0 
1933/34 0 13 -1 
1934/35 117 126 2 
Total 1929-35 209 412 21 - - • 
(Source s C 0 .D © \ 0 C 0 Annual Report 1930-1940, in Brett p. 137) 
7. B.\» Brett, Colonialism an1 Underdevelopment in East Africa, the 
Politics of Economic Change, 1919-1939, (Nairobi, Heinemann, 1973). 
This book is one of tiio best sources of information regarding British 
policy towards the colonies, before 1945* 
8. 3.A. Brett, ibid, pp.143-144. 
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By 19.30 even grants in i h v; been preclu ed (supposedly replaced. 
by the CDV scheme), and the policy of retrenchment nas in full swing. The Lord 
Privy 3e.il in September 1931 suggested to the colonic; that in order to assist 
the United kingdom, • colonic - in receipt, of grants in li 1 should make all 
economics possible, 'whilst in those better pi iced no loans should, be raised 
if possible, since every loan raised "ill necessarily put \ fresh strain on 
the structure of British credit'. 'The depressed conditions in Britain and 
the colonies had made it impossible for the CD\ assistance to be utilised 
to .my effect. Revenue in the colony was derived mainly from local sources, 
of "rhich the most important established by the local administration were 
native hut (or poll tax) and customs duties, which alone produced 60-80* of 
all revenue in the colony. The setiler community objected to any form of 
direct income tax, which they were successfully able to evade until 1938,when 
the central government was able to force a bill on the colonial administration 
to tax the local European farming community. Including cross-payments with 
regard, to the .railway administration, expenditure in Kenya Colony rose from 
£1,909,0$ in 1922 to £3,114,912 in 1930 . Kenya's public debt in 1936 was 
equal to £17,560,000?£17,200,000 of this was incurred between 1921 and 1933, 
of which 75^ was for railways and harbours. \s revenues dropped in the 1930s, 
9 
interest became a heavier burden on the local administration. At no time 
had the metropolitan government made provision for long term loans to assist 
either agriculture or manufacturing. Indeed, the colonial ^ministration in 
East Africa was frowned upon by the Colonial Office for investing a heavy 
proportion of its revenue in infrastructur il developments that were not 
considered necessary on such a scale in an area that did not have a very high 
resource potential. The Colonial Office felt that both settler and native 
agricultural proluction was too small to merit the high level of protection 
offered. 'The whole policy of Kenya requires review with the general end 
of tapering off the bounties and protection on the parasitical crops and so 
stopping them becoming bur en on the real economical industries of the • >10 country. 
G. Oates, The Colonial Office,, Kenya and Development^1^29 - 1.241 r 
an unpublished conference paper presented""at the CambrxHge 'fistory 
Conference in June 197% 
10. Colonial Office Report - CO 652/l2/l5201, Macmillan Library. 
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The imperial government was clearly not willing to offer capital 
assistance on any large scale for agricultural concerns that it considered 
to be non-viable® However, when the depression hit the prices of primary 
commodities hard, the administration was forced to support these 'uneconomic' 
farmers, and a land betrifcvas forme 1 in 1931 to provide credit on easier 
terms. However the most common forms of credit before and after 1931 were 
through the commercial banks that had est iblished themselves in 3ast Africa 
loans 11 during the 1920s4 all of whom would advance/to handle the producers crop. 
It will be shown that both on a general and specific level that the 
British need for complementary colonial economies resulted in a lack of in 
interest in industrial development in the colonies, .'furthermore in the few 
cases where colonial industries did present a threat to metropolitan capital, 
they were squashed by the central colonial administration. 
The work of the development agencies set up in the 1920's reflected 
the British government'a unwillingness to establish colonial industries. 
The Empire Market Board for instance gave no assistance to manufacturing 
and limited itself to the marketing of Empire food and raw materials.The 
Colonial Development Idvisory Committee placed no limit on its sphere of 
activity, but ignored the industrial sector. By 1939 it had allocated just 
under £3 million of which £151,000 was for industrial projects, and of this 
amount, only £23,000 or 0.3;.* of the total allocations had been disbursed 
(£16,000 of this went to the meat processing plant for Tanganyika.) As 
we will show in the section on trade, by the late 1930's Britain still 
dominated the E.African market for manufactured goods, and. needed to defend 
1° this position against any threat from potential local manufacturers. 
The two most significant cases where the British government 
suceeded in destroying import substitution were the match factory set up by 
Japanese interest/and a twine factory which x/as baclced. by British capital , 
both of these projects were in Tanganyika. The match company was under 
pressure from the Colonial Office in 1928, for schemes of this kind might 
present a serious threat to the hold which British manufactured goods had 
exsrted over East African markets. Accordingly, the British government 
imposed an excise duty on the local product which served to contradict the 
local protection afforded by the existing import revenue duty. The match 
11. R.M.A, van Zwannenberg, Colonial Capitalism and Labour in Kg; 
1919-1939, (East African Literature Bureau 1975), p.21. 
12. E.A. Brett, op. cit., p.26S. 
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factory, having to face such staggering condition's was to collapse after 
several years. 
mother exuaplc of pressure • brought to bear by British industrial 
capital on 'infant industries' in the British colonies before the Second World 
'Jar can be fount.'1 in the ease of the trim and cordage industry which had grown 
up in Kenya and Tanganyika in the 1920's. The Imperial Preference system 
established between Britain and her colonies after the Ottowa agreement of 
1932, was supposed to guarantee colonial producers free access to British 
an;1 Commonwealth markets. However, /hen the question of colonial industries 
exporting their manufactured goods to Britain arose, it became clear that 
the Preference system functioned only selectively as this letter from the 
Secretary of State addressedto the Hovernor of Tanganyika in 1934 showed; 
H... the Secretary of State has received, very vigorous complaints from'the 
binder twine manufacturers in this country about the importation of binder 
twine from Tanganyika, ,rhile the actual 'mount i3 not large 5 only abour 500 
tons out of a total consumption of about 10,000 tons n„ 1., the manufacturers 
complain that the arrival of the twine in this country and its offer at 
prices substantially below their own is threatening to undermine the whole 
structure of the industry...the home market is the only secure market which 
the manufacturers enjoy and it is only in that market that they can make any 
profit at all...the Secretary of State cannot but admit that the complaint 
of the manufacturers is a reasonable one...the agreement by which the rope 
manufacturers have undertaken to foster the use of colonial sisal in this 
country and elsewhere, is of the greatest importance to the colonial sisal 
producers and they coul ; not possibly countenance any action which would 
13 alienate the sympathies of the rope manufacturers' . 
This was clear throat to the colonial producers of twine that 
if they did not cease their exports to metropolitan markets then stern 
measures would be taken against them. The Tanganyika company refused to 
agree to restrict its exports, so a proliibitive tariff was invoked in 1934 
on a whole range of articles, including sisal twine. These moves forced the 
Tanganyikan producers to negotiate with the Federation and agreed to raise 
its prices if it was to be allowed entry to the Bi*itish market. Under these 
conditions thoy coul • not survive and the company ceased operating in 193"» 
13- The details of this conflict and the official correspondence 
between the Colonial Office and the Tanganyikan twine company are to be 
foun'1 in a pamphletj Prohibitive Duties on Colonial Empire Products, 
(1934) , Macnri 11 an Library. 
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CunliffeLester, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
was in 1930 asked to explain the untimely demise of the twine industrT 
in Tanganyika by some members of the Joint East Africa Board (JEAB) 
who had been involved in the Tanganyika scheme. In defence of 
the Imperial Government's actions Cunliffe Lester denied that ''all 
goods manufactured by native labour within the Colonial Empire 
would be debarred from Britain" but he stressed that "the great 
interest of the Colonies is to secure markets for their primary 
products' and underlined the importance of 'complementary px-eferences 
covering primary exports to Britain and British manufactured exports 
to the Colonies". The basis of the Imperial Position was made 
deai* in the conclusion to his speech: 
.."It is only in comparatively few cases that a conflict 
of interests arises, and in such cases I hope that the realisation 
of the importance of the general policy will lead to satisfactory 
agreements (as in the case of the Cordage Company".)1^' 
The members of the Tanganyika legislative council did not 
consider the arrangement to have been satisfactory in any way and 
a>3.R. 'vfi -a^ j^ rj.-'vuii t^ j sttxy"xug t-j.2'uui 'Cut Ueeasaon was "cajsen 
to impose the tariff on the twine industry:-
"If we are to accept i+ as a hard and fast rule that no 
industry can be allowed to establish itself without having to pay 
the full cost of Customs Protection as it exists in this country 
today, we can never hope to establish local industry in this 
country and what will be our position ir. the future if we allow this 
1 5 to happen?. 
These examples show the Colonial Government's support of 
the interests of British industrial capital. However, if the plant 
concerned only produced for the local market, as in the case of the 
Kenyan sisal bags industry (East African Bag and Cordage), then 
the attitude of the metropolitan government was one of indifference. 
The only two cases during this pre-war period where state support 
was given to manufacturing projects was the flax mill in Tanganyika 
and the beef processing factory in Kenya. In the case of the Liebigs 
meat factory the state undertook tc provide not only the loan capital 
14. Pamphlet, ibid. 
15. Ibid. 
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for the construction of plant, but they also guaranteed to ensure the 
factory a consistent throughput of cattle by introducing compulsory 
purchase legislation. This assistance to the meat packing industry 
was prompted by settler demands for an outlet for their high 
grade chilled meat. More important to the administration in Kenya 
was that the factory provided a chance for the forcible 'destocking' 
of Kamba herds, which the administration considered to have seriously 
overgrazed the land.^ 
It was, however a consistent principle in Kenya, where 
the settler class was more substantial than the other two territories, 
that if the interests of foreign capital affected 'local' manufactu-
rers the local administration would consistently back the local pro-
ducers, albeit not always successfully. The most striking case 
in the pre-war period was with regard to the manufacture of wattle 
extract. Throughout the 1930's a prolonged battle was fought between 
the international company, Forestal Land and Timber Company, who 
used the Colonial Office to support its claims to monopoly, and 
the local producers of wattle extract, an Asian firm, Premchand 
Raichand, who were backed by the local bureaucracy. Forestal was 
in a stronger position due to its size and influence at the 
Imperial level, and eventually won the battle to control the 
conditions of wattle production in Kenya by establishing a duopsony 
1 7 with the Asian competitor on terms favourable to itself. 
It is necessary to substantiate the claim that the 
settlers were able , .-.-aanipullistethe local administration to their 
own advantage, in Kei.ya. Lord Delamere's effect on the policies 
of local government in defence of the large settlor farming 
interests can be illustrated by his role in the Repeal of the 
1 3 
Income Tax Ordinance of 1 9 2 0 . T h e New League, which 
represented a group of settlers, with Lord Delamere as its spokesman 
objected to the introduction of taxation that would affect the 
'non-native' classes. The tax bill had been instigated in response 
to Colonial Office pressure in the 1922 Budget for the Colony. 
Lord Delamere then moved a resolution in the Council that, the 
Income Tax Ordinance of 1920 should be repealed and increased 
16. This move was met by strong resistance from the Kamba cattle 
owners who were to delay the whole operation for several years by 
blocking the attempts of the administration to force them to sell 
cattle to Liebig's meat factory. These details can be found in: 
Kenya National Archives (KNA), CS 2/23. In 
17. M.P. Cowen, Wattle Production in Central. Province: Capital 
and Household Commodity Production, 1~903-1964, (IDS Nairobi 
Working Paper ZAugust 1975). 
-io TO M ^ n ^ c ^ Pr.cn. nn.cit.. DD. 1 56-1 57. 
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import duties should be substituted for income tax on European 
settlers. ' The Kenya government made representations to the 
Secretary of State that the tax was unpopular in the colony, 
and the Secretary of State sanctioned the repeal of the income 
tax bill in May 1922. The provision was that new customs duties, 
calculated to produce equivalent revenue of a type to fall on 
'non-native' purchasers were substituted. This victory of the 
larger settler class had avoided direct taxation and at the same 
time promoted nationalist measures designed to encourage import 
substitution of many goods, particularly foodstuffs. Indeed the 
principle of protection was re-affirmed by the Kenya Tariff Commitee 
1 9 of 1929. 
Indeed the whole financial policy of the colony up to 
1930 was founded on the principle that Africans should provide 
the bulk of tax revenue while the Europeans had access to most of 
the services. However, by 1933 with the slump conditions in 
Britain, there was increasing pressure from Britain that the 
continued failure to balance the budget in the colony should lead 
to the introduction of income tax. It was accordingly introduced 
in 1936, as there had been a change of governorship that year, 
which the Colonial Office hoped would ensure the uninterrupted 
passage of the bill. The income tax was finally introduced in 
that year after two unsuccessful attempts, one in 1920 and the 
other in 1931. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that very little direct 
assistance was given to the processing and manufacturing industries 
in the East African Colonies before the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Act in 1940, which was to make available £5m per year 
21 
for ten years for 'schemes for any purpose of its people'. 
During the 1930's the Kenyan Farmers Association (KFA) had kept 
up constant pressure on the East African section of the London 
Chamber of Commerce for imperial policy's tolerance of industriali-
zation in the colonies. In 1936, the East African Section of 
19. Details to be found in. The Report of the Kenya Tariff Committ 
(Government Printer, Nairobi, May 1929); available in Nairobi 
University Library. 
20. Lord Hailej , op.cit., p. 1323. 
21. Ibid, p. 1324. 
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the Chamber of Commerce pressed the Colonial Office for a clear 
decision on the issue, and the ^eply was that 'there was no law 22 by which the Colonial Office could prohibit industries'. 
The war was to act as the final catalyst to the changing 
needs of British industrial capital, so that after 1945 a new set 
of colonial policies were to emerge. The managing director of 
Smith Mackenzie had even claimed by 1939 that 'the opinion in 
England on secondary industry in the Dominions was altering to 
24 the better'. 
Therefore it can be observed from the outset of colonial 
rule that there occured a juxtaposition of metropolitan interests 
with those of the local settler class. The dynamics of this 
proposition will be born out in the following sections. 
Part II LOCAL ACCUMULATION, 1907-1945 
Before examining the impetus behind the expansion of 
international capital into Kenya, it is first necessary to 
outline the nature of the local settler class in the Colony. 
The basis for their accumulation was the land and agriculture. 
However, we shall not be concern with the workings of settler 
agriculture in Kenya, a subject which has been dealt with elsewhere, 
because the primary interest of this study is in non-agricultural 
capital formation. It is felt that this type of accumulation is 
best reflected by a focus on company formation. 
22. In: London Representation of East Africa, a London Chamber of 
Commerce Debate, in, the 'East Africa and Rhodesia', 
25/1/40. (P.O. Library, London No:(s) 15318.). 
23. Smith Mackenzie was one of the largest British-based, import-
export firms which operated in Kenya from 1907. 
24. E.A. Brett, op.cit., p. 279. 
25. For instance, the research of Apollo Njonjo for his forth-
coming Ph.D. thesis on 'Land and Class Formation in Kenya1, 
(Princeton University), and also R. van Zwannenberg, 
'Colonial Capitalism and Labour in Kenya1, East African 
Literature Bureau (1975). 
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This analysis on company formation in the Colony has 
been divided into two parts, the first from 1907-1922, the second 
from^'; 922-1945. These divisions are important in that they 
reflect both a change in the pattern of company formation, which 
after 1922 is more extensive and diverse, and also a significant 
v, 26 change in company law. 
Part II (a) Company Forration 1907-1922; 
The settler class was primarily engaged in extracting 
surplus from agricultural production. Due to their prominent 
position, they v/ere able to use state mechanisms to support their 
own interests; for instance legislation was passed which ensured 
that most productive land was allocated to themselves exclusively, 
and the labour laws guaranteed supplies of 'native labour' to 
European estates. What was the pattern of company formation and 
in what type of enterprises did tese few individuals invest? 
A most striking feature of this first period of company 
formation in Kenya is the instability of such investments and the 
27 
interlocking nature of ownership. The average life span of the 
first thirty-five public companies to be registered in the Colony 
(the date of formation to the date of winding up) was only nine 
years, with five of them surviving for less than one year. The 
'concentration of assets' of these firms amongst such few 
individuals can be shown by examining their personal holdings. 
Lord Delamere, one of the moot prominent settler barons, owned 
a share in the capital of three of these companies, These 
companies were Unga Ltd, Nyama Ltd and the Times of East 
Afric.% »n important instrument of settler politics. Nyama was 
a cattle ranch, and Unga was a grain milling concern. Delamere's 
position as a large farmer and politician was thus reflected in 
his business formations. 
The infamous Capt. E.S. Grogan, another prominent 
settler-politician, who was principally a timber concessionaire and 
property speculator, had shareholdings in a total of 6 out of these 
35 companies. Most of these companies were owned jointly with 
26. These two subdivisions were chosen partly in accordance with 
the registers in the Companies Registry, Nairobi. 1922 was the 
point when the Indian Companies Act, operative in Kenya before tha \ 
time, was changed to the British Companies Act, which in itself wa 
partly a move to accomodate the increasing scale of company format 
in the Colony. 
27. There is a jarallel here with the present stage in Kenya of 
primitive accumulation by indigenous Kenyans. 
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other members of his family, notably his wife G.3. Grogan an." his brother 
^ogan. "11 these 6 companies were concerned with the exploitation 
/.nd 
of land/ property anc- they included Kilin ini Harbours an I Wharf Co,Ltd 5 
Upper Nairobi Township and Estate Co5 Masailand Trust Corporation; IJdimu 
28 
Ltd; Miti Ltd; and Kenani Fibrelands. The control of 'Cilindini Harbour 
and Wharf Company became controversial and illustrated the political strength 
of this settler class when it came to manipulating the state to its own a 
advantage. The company had been set up in 1906 by Capt. Grogan, along with 
his wife and .another settler, U.C. Hunter, with the Grogan family having the 
controlling interest. Grogan had been 'unofficially' granted 50 acres of 
land abutting on Kilinddni Harbour in Mombasa, which was not confirmed until 
1918. Here he had constructed a small timber wharf, equipped with overhead 
transport gear for unloading cargoes from ships. There was strong pressure 
on the administration from elements of the settlor group to purchase the wharf. 
They resented the fact that an essential service was controlled by an 
individual rather than by the state, finally after four years of negotiation, 
Grogan agreed to sell to the Government the wharf and 50 acres of land at 
a price of £350,000, in 1925. This 'package' included the wharf which had 
been valued at £37,000 in 1920 and 50 acres of land which had been granted 
to Grogan under a lease with nominal rental only, and some adjacent properties-
making in all a total of 1/+6 acres. The Government had not only paid an e 
exorbitant price for the wharf ind surrounding lands, but they were not able 
for some years to come, to enjoy the use of the wharf which had been privately 
leased by Grogan to x wharfage company. This lease continued to operate to 
the exclusion of the new owner; the Government. Furthermore, within six 
months of purchase, the wharf began to show signs of collapse. 
W.C. 'Tunter, a company secretary by profession .had shareholdings 
in no less than 9 companies, several of which overlapped, with Capt. Grogan. 
These companies, including the Upper Nairobi Township Co. were mainly 
concerned with property and farming. Similarly Mr. W. Fletcher, a law clerk 
in Nairobi, had shares in ^companies. Again these companies were largely 
concerned with land, property and farming, the only exception being Nairobi 
Motor Transport a company run by he and Hunter. Fletcher was also involved 
in Lord Delamere's company' Nyama Ltd', with Hunter*. -lis companies also 
overlapped with Capt. Grogan, for instance the joint subscribers for the 
Masailand Trust Corporation were Grogan, Allsopp and Fletcher. 
28. Kenani Fibrelands was a sis-al estate and Miti Ltd was a timber 
company, The others were concerned with land and property development. 
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The Mackinnon Brothers owned two companies in this group, which 
were both concerned with lan levelopments the Nairobi Prospecting and 
Acquiring Syndicate (1907) and Mackinnon Bros Ltd. (1911)< These two had 
established themselves through the import-export trade. 
If these settlers were not engaged in farming full time, they all 
were engaged in some kind of profession, which they used as a base for accu-
mulation. These were quite varied - iccountants, solicitors, jewellers, 
engineers, architects and so on. However a common feature of this early 
phase of primitive accumulation is the combination of ownership and management 
in these firms, lome other characteristic features of these early companies 
are that the areas of investment are limited in scopo and directed towards 
concerns that will reproduce capital rapidly. In other words we can consider 
this stage of accumulation to have been highly speculative, given limited 
areas of investment and the unstable nature of many firms. An example of 
this concentration on particular types of enterprise can1be found in the 
fact that out of a total of 35 companies, 25 were involved in land and pro-
perty development and agriculture, with the rest in trading and small scale 
servicing such as printing and newspapers. Another aspect of this initial 
stage of capital formation is the scarcity of investment in forms of manu-
facturing, that reouire more capital. He only see capital expandirg into 
basic manufacturing in the next per.iod after 1922. The only exception to 
this rule after 1907 was the Mombasa Electric Light and Power Company, forfned 
in 1908 to generate electric powor in Mombasa, which became the first town 
in British East Africa to have electric light. 'The company was notable in 
other respects for it was unusually a partnership between Asian and European 
shareholders; Messrs Esmailjee Jivanjee & Co. held 70^ and Aid Udall et al 
held 30^. In 1924 this company "as to be incorporated as East African Power 
and Lighting Co, a public company. This formation included the recruitment 
of •foreign' expertise in the form of Power Securities Corporation and 
30 
Balfour Beatty," who acted as the companies'management and technical con-
sultants until 1970. 
All the first 35 public companies are now extinct, although 
several, as in the case of EAPL wore reconstituted in a different form. 
Unga, originally Lord Dclamere's preserve, was reconstituted several times, 
29. These were the Mackinnon brothers who also controlled the East 
African Trading Company. 
30. From 1922 onwards the East African Power and Lighting Company 
been managed by power Securities Ltd nd Balfour Beatty of London; until 
1970, when the power industry was nationalised in Kenya. 
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and from 1928 oomrds it was controlled by the KFA which was dominated ,\>y large 
31 settler farmers." However most firms died prematurely, for quite predictable 
reasons, "or instance the 'Cooper tive Socicty of 3.H.A.' went into liquida-
/linc 
tion only / months after it., form '.tion in 1907 'uc to 'the large number of 
debts which still remain'. The irobi Printing and Publishing Co. collapsed 
in a similar fashion, the same ye.<r as its formation in 1904. The Times of 
Bast \frica, a newspaper controlled by Lor'" Del^mere lasted from 1905-1908 
when it was reformed. The absence of \sian capital in the public company 
sector ,Jas not altogether surprising for their merchant capital was not yet 
on a large enough scale to form public companies, and their commercial activi-
ties aroma1 the turn of the century '/ere confined to' business partnership forms. 
The t"o exceptions in this group were the Mombasa Electric Light Co,which 
was a partnership, and the Indian Trading \ssociation, registered in 1904 
with an issued capital of lupous 100,032 which went into liquidation six years 
later in 1910. 
This pattern of early comp.iny formation of settler companies in 
Kenya Colony exhibits certain features which are common to most preliminary 
stages of primitive capital accumulation. These features can be summarised 
as general instability, limited range of enterprises often of a speculative 
nature, and interlocking personnel, both in terms of management and share-
holding. 
Part 11 (b) 
Company Formation, 1922-1945. 
Number and Size of Companies; We have laid stress in the first period (from 
1907-22), on the unstable pattern of tho earlier public companies formed in 
Kenya. Conversely, the 1922-45 or intor™ar period is characterised by a 
greater degree, of stability and by the expansion of companies in the Colony, 
a process accompanied by an increase in the numbers and activities of firms 
both local and foreign. Indeed it is predictable that after two dccades 
of capital accumulation in the Colony, companies would survive over a longer 
period, and exhibit more stable characteristics . The following table shows 
31. Unga Ltd is still in existence and is part of a larger conglomerate, 
Ilercat Ltd, which is now the dominant firm in the bread and grain milling-
industry. 
32. This information on early companies in Kenya was derived from the 
first Public Companies Register in the 3)epartment of the Registrar General 
1907-1922. 
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the number of firms on the regirter n.-. those struck off each year between 
1927-1945. 
Table 2 Companies on the Register an'."' those Struck Off, 
Year go's on Register Go'-; struck off S.off Go's as % of 
Total 
1927 289 19 6.6 
1930 399 37 9.3 
1933 472 30 6.4 
1936 593 29 5.0 
1939 641 25 4.0 
1942 670 18 2.6 
1945 811 16 2.0 
(Source; Annual Reports of the Registrar General). 
This table illustrates a consistent trend of expansion in the 
total number of companies on the register in the Colony, with a corresponding 
decline in those struck off or removed from the register over the period 
between 1927 an1 1945. (1930 marks the highest number of companies failing 
which is when the effects of the Depression were felt in the colony). 
l¥iv ite Companies; 
This growing level of company formation was accompanied by an 
expansion in the size o" such companies as well as in the range'of activities 
in which these firm;; 'ere engaged. Out of a l/3 list sample of companies 
registering between 1922 ind 1945, the average paid up capital for the eighty 
five companies was £97,065. "fowever, t^ j.^  average covers a wide range of 
firm sizes, (with a standard c eviatior/of'Some companj.es have only a small 
paid up capital; for instance, Cobb Ltd, a settler firm of pi.inters had 
equity of "499 . But some were much larger such as the East African Tanning 
33 
and ..Extract Company," which ma owned by a British firm of wattle cxtract 
manufacturers, an - ha • a paid up capital in 1937 of £800,000. 
This sample of private companies gives some indication as to the 
areas of investment in which each racial group was involved. Table (4) 
shows that the largest category of all the communities together is th\t of 
33. The dast African Tanning m 1 '•'Extract Company was owned by 
i?orestal Land and Timber Company from 1933. Tiis parent company was b\ 
in Britain and was a dominant manufacturer of bark extract. 
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wholesale md retail it 27"' of the total number of companies, followed by 
agricultural production at nineteen percent, import-export at seventeen point 
eight and buil dng construction in.' real ostate accounting for nearly seventeen 
percent. of the total® From this sample Cur ope an firms predominate in the 
area of agricultural production 1 \rgoly due to the fact that the settlers 
had preserved this particular area of accumulation exclusively for themselves. 
The next largest area for investment by Europeans in this sample is in pro-
perty and real estate and there is only . small interest in manufacturing 
of any kind, '"his is predictable bee IUSO the processing of agricultural 
products 'fas undertaken by the settlers in some cases collectively through 
such organisations as the Kenya Farmers Association, Kenya Co-operative 
Creameries, and the Kenya Planters Union. It will be shown that in the larger 
public companies during the same period of company formation (1922-45) 
Europeans took quite a substantial interest in processing of primary products. 
The regulation against land holdings in the most productive areas 
nj 
of Kenya thai, applied to 'non— durope ms' ensured that Asian r •' participation 
in agricultural production until Independence, via5 minimal. From the sample 
it is clear that \sian merchant capital was channelled mainly into trade 
and services, the largest category being the import/export trade, followed 
by wholesale/ret ail ant' services. Tims there was a considerable increase in 
the rate of Asian company formation before 1945» Furthermore, leaving aside 
the registered companies, Asian partnerships also formed an overwhelming 35 
proportion of those firms registered under the business Partnership Act. ' 
^or instance in 1949 they constituted no less than 90"/ of these business, 
although, by 1955 this proportion had dropped to 75/% Africans having filled 
the gap. (Africans do not really feature in company or business partnerships 
until after the Second "orId '.Tar when in 1946 24 companies were formed). 
34» In 1915» the Crown hands Ordinance empowered the Governor to veto 
land transactions between races. -Tvon in 1900, Lord Elgin had noted,'...as 
a matter of administrative convenience, grants of land in the upland areas 
should not be made to Indians'. Africans were confined to the Reserves which 
had been established by the Colonial Government. This had the effect of 
reserving the mass of the prime agricultua-al land for white settlers. 
35° The Partnership Act enabled only two partners to participate in 
business which was-.: not protected by limited liability, which meant that debts 
incurred by the business could fall on the partners personally . This would 
be a considerable disincentive to developing any largo scale business under 
the- partnership act and therefore most partnerships consisted of small shops. 
'Partnerships' must be distinguished from limited liability companies in this 
paragraph. 
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However it is significant that in the earlier years of company formation 
these Asian business partnerships ware largely confinea to wholesale and 
retail trade on •>. very small scale» Any enterprise that needed to raise 
large sumo of local capital could.-do do more effectively through the vehicle 
of a joint stock company, 
It is clear from this sample that Asian merchant capital was not 
to expand in any significant way into manufacturing until after the Second 
vorld Tar* However this needs qualification as Asian firms had moved into 
certain forms of primary processing even before 1945, the most important being 
oil milling and cotton ginning in both Kenya and Uganda. The merchant capital 
accumulated by this group through trade and commerce and small scale primary 
processing before the war was to provide the basis for their move into 
industrial production after 1945° Leys identified this class as a merchant 
capitalist class which was poised to become an industrial bourgeoisie of the 
36 classical type'."'' After the war, largo industrial empires grow up such as 
those of the Modvhani's;, Chandarid and Mdnji's although this potential 
• i j • t • bourgecifc-ie , „ • •. . . • .i • industrial . • j / - was never vale to fully consolidate nos position 
in Kenya beyond making temporary alii -neon, because of its failure to control 
state powers. 
The wo tkness of sottlor capital was evident when it came to with -
standing competition from asian and foreign firm:- and is shown by its fail.urc 
to move into in-'ustry after the Second 'forld *f«r. Therefore immediately 
after the Second, "orld " botwec,.. 3S-':-'*» :..d 1?55 a largo proportion of 
local settler firms were absorbed either by Asian firms or by foreign tasod 
37 
corporations. " although the mover ant in quantitative terms in the 1922-45 
sample i3 limited: a tendency of Asian firms talcing over European enterprises 
is evident. The following eight companies fall into this category, ie. 
they wore owned by JUuroponns before the war and almost all of these were 
taken over immediately after 1945••> 
36. Colin Leys, Underdcvolopren0 ir Ken/a, tl.a Political Ecc.ao.ay 
of Neocolonialism, (Holneaann i<o~-on, 1975 J? p. 
37°' A point which is drawn out in more detail bysR, Eglin, The 
Oligopolistic Structure and Coripe^ il; ,vc Ch-aractcrintica of Direct For pi; " 
Investment in Keixya*s Monuf.cturirt•: Sector~ ?Smeo, 7 Cambridge Universi -
1975), p.16. 
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Public Comp ini 
It is necosocjry for the completeness of this ua '.lysis to examine 
public company formation during the same period, 1922 - 1945® This has been 
Achieved by u one quarter list sample of ill those public companies formed 
between those dates, see table 5« There are fewer public companies in Kenv -
than there are private, and it is important to bear in mind, that public 
companies are in general larger formations than their private counterparts. 
To give some indication of the comparative size difference between two types 
of company, the average capital nor company in each of the samples was cal-
culated. From eighty five private companies the average paid up capital per 
company was £97»065(with a st and. ir deviation of 22,457), whereas the average 
equity for the 22 Public companies was £396,083 (standard, deviation, 20,908). 
The Public and Private companies therefore coming from different populations 
/ exhibit.,, o.t companies / , ax referent characteristics, with the private companies 
showing a slightly liigher variation from the mean 
30 Table (6) Constitution of Samples % 
31"-
Private Companies 
facial Op No of comp.anies 
Asian - 50 
Foreign - 14 
,;)uropean - 21 
85 
T^ ublic Companies 
Racial Gp No's of companies 
59 Asian 2 
16 Foreign 9 
25 European 11 
10CT$ 22 
"s 
9 
41 
50 
100;& 
The different composition of the samples clearly show that the 
Asian group form the largest proportion (59a) of the private companies while 
in the public group iXiropean an1 Foreign firms predominate together with 91* 
of the total number of companies. 'There as the private Asian firms are 
37A. A 2 tailed t-test showed that the difference between the two values 
of doflated paid up capital is significant at the Y* level (t=15.47). 
rho Companies paid up capital values were defl ited by a cost of 
living index 1971=100) to account for price changes over the period,1922-46. 
The cost of living index was derived from a study of real wages. See 
M.P. Cowen and J.Newman, leal wages in Central Kenya. 1924-1971, 
mimeo, Nairobi, 1976. 
38. These racial groups are derived not from the nationality of 
directors, as in the Registrar's classification, but rather those firrr-
with over 50j£ of its shareholding falling "ithin a p.articular racial groi 
Before 1945 there were very few 'inter-racial' partnerships, so thin m t; 
is quite .an accurate assessment of majority ownership. 
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concentrated in the area of trading with small capital requirements. The 
jurope a -nd Foreign groups of public companies are largely situated within 
the areas of manufacturing aid gener'.1 engineering in. mining, (see table 5) . 
"he agricultural sector of the public companies sample ccounts for eighteen 
percent of the tot-J. number of firm: , and local Europe, in firms '.re dominant 
in this .roa. The manufacturing ,roup contains five companies throe of which 
are local European. These firms ire significantly 11 concornod with the 
processing of primary products rhoroas the two foreign firms in the group 
ire engaged in non-agricultural manufacturing. It will liter bo shown in the 
part on 1 International Capital' that the numbers and scope of firms in ill 
forms of so con' try industry wt.ro limited in the pro—war period. 
dumber and Size of firms by racial ;.,roup: 
Taring examined the types' of public and private company formation 
in Kenya before the war it is perhaps rel lvent to briefly allude to the 
Registrar General's statistics on the size of companies in general, which 
includes all of the three typos of companies dealt with in this part, foreign 
branch firms, private and public firms. 
Unfortunately there ire no aggregate st itistics on the relative 
size of firms in each racial group b 
following breakdown for 1946 of nomi 
generally indicative of tho scale 'i 
Tabic (7) Number and Size of Com 
1946 European 
No of Go's Total — 
Nominal Gap.'' 
71 57^9/705 
of ore the Second 'for Id War but tho 
nal capital by each racial Troup is 
fferentials between them5 
p inies tegistorod in 1946; (.?,) 
Isian Af ric. m Total 
No of Go's Total do Nom Ca; 
/Join Gap. 
65 *5bd,W6 24 36,700 
39. Nominal Capital must be distinguished from paid up capital of 
companies, and it is only used here because it is the .form in which the 
Registrar Gener l's statistics ire organised. However, from other samples 
undertaken, it has been established that the nominal capital value stays 
quite consistently above that of issued capital, Pat/rtho Registry filing 
fees are structured according to the nominal capital .'.mount, there is a 
monetary dis—incentive in terms of filing foes, against firms having a 
huge discrepancy between nominal and. issued capital. African companies, 
however represent a deviation from this norm for lack of knowledge of the 
Compmies Act in the early days of company formation (after 1945) meant 
that there would often be a 1-rge discrepancy between nominal and issued 
capital. 
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Tabic (6) 
1946 
1950 
1955 
In this tabic 'ISuropoan firms' include foreign based companies, an : 
this group has the highest c ipital per firm before 1950, although it is 
significant that by 1955 the average capital per company for European and 
Asian firnr. 'fas approximately orjual. These statistics do serve to bear out 
the c ontontion from the comparison of public and private firm^ that before 
1945 Asian firms were generally of a smaller average sise than their Europe-n 
counterparts. 
Foreign .Oranch Firms; 
In addition to those foreign companies registered in Kenya Colony 
as public or private firms, a large number of legally classified 'foreign' 
firmc wore Cormod as branch offices of larger companies registered outside 
Kenya. ^  1 laigh proportion of this foreign category of firm invested in 
mining enterpri- os. In 1937 alone nine new foreign mining companies woro 
registered. These moves were in response to the so called 'K-ikumega Gold 
Hush' which attracted both foreign and local capital in a series of highly 
speculative ventures. The following table shows how tenuous was this form 
of investment in untried mineral resources; 
Table (9) do. of Foreign Go's on Register Foreign Go's 
Jttc 1927.- 1937. " ' * struck off. 
1927 79 12 
1930 103 ' 1 
1933 ill 4 
1934 103 17 
1937 112 8 
( Sources '.nnuc-1 Report of the Registrar General). 
40. These include all foreign based firms registered in Kenya as 
Private or IXiblic companies. 
41. These foreign companies ore branch firms registered under Sec.,:' 
206 of the Companies Act and they are exempt from filing names of directors 
and any {financial data. They cannot, therefore raise capital in V'.eny 
and arc merely branch offices of foreign firms. 
Average Nomln .1 Capita], for each group 
8,500 
17,500 
35,594 
( Source; 
TSiyopean 
24,000 
33,000 
36,000 
African 
3,612 
7,166* 
"(onlvr 2 companies) 
Annual Reports of the Registrar General) 
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FART III 
Ti'.DB iND TARIFFS IN THE COLO !Y. 
a) Tariffs in Kenya Colony.' 
Before discussing the patterns of tra e in East Africa, it is nece-
ss .ry to evaluate the composition of t iriffs in Kenya Colony before the Second 
World War. 
Prior to 1922, import duties in Kenya, as in ill three East African 
territories ^ere limited in scope and were designed to raise revenue without 
having any protective intent. However, the emerging class of estate pro-
ducers amongst the settlers, which relied on exporting agricultural products 
as well as supplying the home market, clearly found that tariffs against 
imported foodstuffs were necessary for their survival. \s part one has illu-
strated, the larger estate producers such as Lord Delamere, exterted extensive 
pressure over the local administration in the Colony. It is therefore not 
surprising that in 1922 the Bowring Committee, which had been set up to evalua-
te the need for protective tariffs in the Colony , deliberately adopted the 
principle of fostering 'suitable industries' as a foundation for economic 
J O 
policy. The main idea behind the recommend,ations of the committee was to 
encourage local production for export in order to give stimulus to theagri-
cultural industry as a whole and ' to improve the economic position of the so 
Colony by so developing local resources /us to render unnecessary the importa-
tions of foodstuffs and other articles which could be locally produced'. k 
It was decided that each branch of the agricultural industry would be given 
substantial import protection for a period of seven years, after which time 
its effectiveness would be re—considered. 
Thus in 1922 a whole series of import duties were imposed on specific 
and general classes of items, for instance beer had a duty imposed of 2/-
per Imperial Gallon, , Cheese and Butter a duty of l/- per lb, .and 
Report of the Kenya Tariff Committee, May 1929, (Kenya Government 
Printer), p.3 
43. Ibid., p.2. 
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wheat ( on the grain) a duty ox" 5/~ per hundred lbs. and ground, 6/- per 
hundred lbs* In addition manufactured goods were in general subject to an 
ad* valorem tax, having been divided into three groups that imposed an ad 
valoren tax of between ten and thirty percent.^ 
The structure of duties established in 19-22 was to remain unchanged 
until 1930c In 1924 a Cost of Living Commission was set up to monitor price 
increases in the Colony, in response to considerable pressure from the white 
45 
petit bourgeoisie, who by the mid 1920»s were » feeling the squeeze' of 
increased costs on their standard of living.^ This cost of Living Commission 
reported early in 1929, and -it was in direct response to this commission that 
the Kenya Tariff Committee was cot up in 1929 to review the system of tariff 
•'n the Colony. .Ill the recommendations of the Kenya Tariff Committer 
were accepted by the Legislative Assembly (LEG CO) in 1930-
Under the new structure of tariffs, the aim was to protect certain 
local industries more specifically than before, and to reduce duties on 
certain items which affected consumption of the settler class. Thus, the 
existing system of classification by rates, was abandoned in favour of classi-
fication by commodities; and all the ad valorem groups were converted into ' / 7 
duties for specific items, The principle of suspended duties was also 
introduced c . some items in order ti. t the three East African governments 
could more easily adjust the common system of duties to their own requirements. 
There was a general move of tariff rates downwards, which was in response 
to the settler pressure wnich had instigated the Cost of Living Commission. 
There was a reduction in rates of duty on imported sugar, reduced from 12/= 
per 100 lb to 6/- per 100 lb? cotton piece goods from forty cents per lb to 
thirty cents per lb; on cement the advalcrem duty was reduced by 10$. The 
most drastic reduction was on wheat ( on the grain) and wheat flour which was 
reduced from 5/— per hundred lbs. to 3/- and from 6/- per hundred lbs to 3/-, I r\ respectively. 1-0 This was certainly of assistance to the bulk of the white 
4/+. Blue Books of Kenya Colony, 1925-1937, (Macmillan Library, Nairobi). 
These contain the details of duties on each item, 
45. This class are not only small farmers but also small shopkeepers 
etc. 
46. For further information on tho Cost of Living Commission and a 
complete real wages/prices index (1924-1972) see; Newman and M.P. Gowen, 
Real Vfagos in Central Kenya, 1924-71 op.cit 
47* Kenya Tariff Committee Report op.cit.,p.4 
48. Information from Blue Books, op. cit. 
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In addition to the foroign mining companies that wound up many local mining 
companies mushroomed between 19 -9 a..I 193':-. 'lost of then)rsuch as the Nyanza 
Gold-fields (1933) -uk'. the Kenya Ining Investment Ltd (1933) only lasted 
for a brief spell before collapsing under a mountain of dobti This form of 
speculative enterprise attracted both local an" foreign capital ..like. 
By sho" ring the extent of company growth .and the type of formations 
e have been able to highlight several aspects of capitalist development 
in the Colony between the 'forId Wars. The overall features .ire that company 
formation was largely in the area of agricultural production, ancill.xy 
services and the processing of primary pro 'ucts. It is \lso clear that such 
processing that did exist in Kenya before 1945 controlled by both local 
Suropo^ 'Ji and Foreign firms, while \i ions were more predominant in the area 
of trade. Therefore, before 1945» due largely to the limitations of 
capitalist development in the Colony, neither local or foreign capital had 
moved to <ny significant extent into manufacturing or secondary industry. 
Table (4). jangle of Private companies registered from 1922-4.5 by nature o; 
enterpris.e : jnd. r..cial group. ( this constitutes a 1/3 list 
sample of firms registering with the Registrar General between 
1922 - 1945)-
Total 
1. Agricultural 
Production & Anc. " ••{ 
Services.>•'. 
2. Food and. Bev lianf, 
rianf of Chemicals, 
lianf of Clothes and 
Textiles 
3. General Engineering 
and. Fining 
4. Transport 
5. Investment and 
Finance 
6.- -Real Estate, • 
Property, Building 
c: Construction 
7. Hotels <?•; Catering 
8. Import/Export 
9. 'Wholesale /Retail 
10. Publis-ling 
Total Companies 
in each group 19 50 C5 
Table 5 PUBLIC COMPANY SAMPLE 
1 Sector 
1 Agricultural Production & 
Ancillary Services 
2 Manf, of Food, Beverages, 
Clothes textiles and 
Chemicals 
3 General Engineering & r lining 
4 Transport 
5 Investment ft finance 
6 Real Estate, Property, 
Building & Construction 
7 dotels & Catering 
8 Import/Export 
9 Wholesale & Retail Tr xde 
10 Publishing & Printing 
TOTAL 
' - 24 -
EUROPEAN FOREIGN i 
NO •JO 
3 
o J 
ri 
A 
75 
60 
40 
100 
100 
3 
1 
1 
25 
40 
60 
100 
100 
50 
ntJJQ/'ir 
AS LAN $ TOTAL i? 
HO 
1 100 
50 
NO 
4 
5 
5 
1 
1 
2 
1 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
11 2 22 100 
PRIVATE GO'S SAMPLE PUBLIC GO'S SAMPLE 
1 Agric. Production & Ancillary 
Services 
2 Manufacturing of Food., Beverages, 
Clothes, Toj:tiles, & Chemicals 
3 General Engineering ft Mining 
> Transport 
5 Investment ft Finance 
6 Real Estate, Property,Building 
ft Construction 
7 Hotels & Catering 
8 Import ft Export 
9 Wholesale <5; Retail Trade 
10 Printing ft Publishing. 
Total 
16 
7 
1 
4 
3 
13 
1 
15 
23 
2 
19 
4.7 
O K J* J 
15.3 
1.2 
18 
27 
si 
No 
4 
5 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
7--
18 
23 
23 
4.5 
4-5 
9 
9 
9 
J u l 
85 100$ 100a 
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consumers (ifricans mainly consume maize flour rather than rheat) , but what 
was the effcct on the Kenyan wheat in'ustry? The Committee officially 
concluded that the reduction of dutier; on this commodity would '..have no 
effect on importations of wheat "or milling in up-country mills... also no 
harm to the industry will be caused by a reduction in the duty to be levied 
on wheat on the grain to the normal rate on foodstuffs'." Only two local 
industries were directly protected in tho 1929 Report, beer was given an extra 
/50 cents duty, from the 2/- per Imperial Gallon imposed in 1922, and the 
tea duty was raised from /45 cents to /50 cents per lb. 
It would seem from examining tho changes in tariff structure in 
1930 that the white consumers in the Colony wero taking precedence over the 
principle of protecting local farming produce. Tliis is certainly not the case, 
50 due to the existence of highly protective railway rates for local produce. 
The Tariff Committee reviewed the existing railway rates and agreed to 
51 
support the continuance of the present structures,' and the extension of the 
practice of differential rates between country produce and import traffic. 
These approved, railway rates fell into three categories; 
a) the principle of quoting low export -rates to Kilindini or 
Mombasa for produce destined for overseas ports outside 
British East African territories should be retained. 
b) that when the need arises to extend or retain markets within 
Bfi\ territories, favourable maximum railway rates should be 
quoted, the question of consignments to the coast being given 
immediate consideration; 
c) The principle of differential rates between country produce and 
import traffic should, exist from all stations. 
49. Kenya Tariff Committee, op.cit.,p.l9 
50. Ibid., pp.0-10. 
51. All the European members of the Tariff Committee agreed that the 
Railway rates should be retained and. extender1 further to protect the agri-
cultural industry. It is, however, significant that the Asian members of 
the committee dissented, from this conclusion, thus representing the small : 
trading class as apposed to those involved in agricultural production. 
'....The other party holds that the Railway Administration docs not provide 
the proper machinery for debating an-', deciding the imount of assistance 
industries should, receive through ifferential rates, that the existence 
of such a policy is likely to introduce political pressure of an undesirable 
type.,' 
(Kenya • Tariff Committee, op. cit.,p. 10). 
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Therefore it is clear that these railway rates provided an important 
medium of protection for local industries, enhanced the effects of protective 
duties, and rendered the importer., item consistently more expensive than its 
local equivalento 
The tariff structure established in 1930, therefore was designed to 
balance the interests of the different sectors of the settler community, and 
the railway rates still favoured a strongly protective system. There is 
virtually no evidence of any-intervention on the tariff question from the metro" 
politan government. The Ottawa Agreement of .1932 established a system of 
52 
Imperial Preference between Britain and her Colonies, which was a response 
to competition from other trading nations. However in Kenya Colony the 
internal tariff structure appears to have been unaffected by the Imperial 
Preference system, and the duties established in 1930 were to remain static 53 
until towards the end of the Second World liar, 
b) Trade in the Colony. 
As we -hall show in later sections, the driving force behind the 
expansion of international firms to Oast Africa was the competition of capital;-.:. 
In order to highlight the intense competition between national capitals 
before the Second World War, the trade figures of the colony will be examined. 
The response to pressure of competition amongst international trading and 
manufacturing firms in the Bast African market, was ultimately to go behind 
the tariff wall and produce the article within the colony. This mechanism 
of 'import substitution', was primarily in response to international compe-
tition, and started in Kenya before the war, with commodities such as tea 
ind wattle, and was to expand after 1945 into the area of industrial goods 
such as paint and cement. The pattern of interwar trade in the three East 
African colonies will give some indication of the general nature of this 
competition. 
i) Imports; 
The position of 3ritain in relation to other principal sources 
of supply is traced over a period of twonty two years from 1925 to 1947 in 
tables (10) and (15). 
52. For further details 0:1 Imperial policy towards the colonies sees 
J.M. Lee, Colonial Development and Qooo Government, (Clarendon Press, Oxfor 
1967), chapter 3. ~ 
53° Refer to the Blue Books, op.cit. 
54. A more detailed consideration of competition for particular 
commodities i ill be found later in tha case studies on international capit
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\t first sight it appears that the share of 3ritain and the .Empire in the 
two countries® imports (Uganda Kenya) remains consistently higher than 
bhe 'other foreign* group, an- that dritain itself is tho largest single 
importer into East Africa. 
Table 10 Domestic Imports into Kenya and Uganda. 
However these aggregate figures are misleading, for not only is the absolute 
British share of total 'Empire' imports into East Africa static, but more 
important, if imports on government account (i.e. imports of bullion and 
specie and transhipment goods) arc disregarded, the share of British 'private 
business to the Colony was not thirty nine per cent in 1937, but nine point 
eight per cent?leaving Japan as the largest single supplier of goods to Kenya 
55 in that year, !d_th eighteen point four per cent of the total. 
suppliers and most notably Japan, were seriously challenging Empire pre-
eminence in the East African markets. In fact the war served as a temporary 
halt on this relaxing of the British hoi'1 over imports into East Africa, 
by knocking two of Britain's largest competitors, Germany and Japan, out of 
the East African market. Indeed a 'Report on the Economic and Commercial 
Conditions in British East Africa, 1937-38' went so far as to assert that, 
"apart from machinery, competition from Japan is now experienced in most line 
56 
for which East Africa affords a market". An indication of how fast was thi 
transition of Japan from a small supplier in the early 1920s to the largest 
single importer into Kenya and Uganda, can be well illustrated by its 
dominance of tho cotton piecc goods markets. Japan moved from having an 
eighteen per cent in 1925 share in Kenya an - Uganda's market for cotton 
55. Unfortunately, the Annual Trade Accounts do not contain a table 
of imports into Kenya uid. Uganda, excluding the Government account from the 
British total. In fact, the point might have been overlooked had attention 
not been drawn to tho fact in the publication; 'economic and. Commercial Condi 
tions in British East Africa, (July 1937-1938), (Dept. of Overseas Trade).in 
the Macmillan Library. 
56. Overseas Economic Survey, Ibid. 
Britain 
G3 & British Possession; 
Other Foreign 
1925 1935 1947 
$ (38.06) (37.0) (39.7) > 
68.99 59.0 67.9 
31.OI 41.0 32.1 
100 100 100 $ 
Before the Second World War, therefore, the other 'foreign' 
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fabrics, to controlling over 70* of this market by 1935 thereby largely 
displacing Britain, India and Mold._ui<3 as the former suppliers of this product. 
By 1937, therefore, apart from ex-porting large quantities of cotton and silk 
piece goods to the East African markets at competitive prices, Japan was 
also supplying cement, clothes, boots an1, shoes, .and .enamelware. Japan.had, 
of course, achieved this penetration of the Bast African markets by under-
cutting the established suppliers, such as Britain. In example of such tactic 
can be found in the following comparative costs for production of glass plate 
and steel. 
av. c.i.f. prices per cwt. UK ... 26/-
" Japan 10/9 
(these prices were also well below those of any of Japan's other competitors). 
A. similar picture can be observed in china were and porcelain; 
TJK S.lOl/- (av„ c.i.f. per cwt) 
Japan 20/- (,! «'• 1000) 
and tiles; UK 225/- (av. c.i.f. per 1000) 
Japan 69/- " Si " 
(Source; Report of Economic and Commercial conditions in British E. Africa 
1937-3C, Department of Overseas Trade). 
In glassware also Japan predominated, having ousted Britain as the main 
supplier of this product in the 1920s. 
Table 11 
Major Importa of glassware into Kenya and Uganda; 
1936 1937 
UK £ 7,339 25 8,573 22 
3olgium 1,644 / O 2,519 6 
Germany 3,889 13 5,883 15 
Japan 13,314 45 17.145 44 
Total 29,126 38.943 
(Source; Colonial Trade Accounts) 
This threat from the East to British and Empire"predominance in the East 
African market did not go unobserved in Britain. In 1928 Crmsby-Gore, fhe 
Secretary of State, was being closely Questioned in the House of Commons a 
the matter of Japanes trade with the Colonies in East Africa. Mr. Hannon(C 
asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether the government was 
that an economic commission appointed by the Japanese Government had recer 
visited Kenya and Uganda, with the object of extending Japanese trade in 
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colonies ant' furthermore, 'having regard to the lo.in commitments of this 
country to feny.i an-. Uganda, whether he will devise measures to safeguard 
"ritish export trade to British Cast frica against the competition of Japan 
,jnd other countries?' Ormsbv-Gore replied in the affirmative to the first part 
of the question but when it camo to protection he asserted the Imperial 
Government's policy it that time, ,'IM Government are anxious to foster British 
export trade to the territories concerned - and would welcome suggestions. 
But it would be inconsistent with existing international obligations to 
extend anjr preferential treatment to goods of British origin imported into 
57 these territories*. ' 
Another country to take a large proportion of tho East African . 
import trade from 1925-1937 was U.S.A.which was in fact ahead, of Japan until 
it was ousted as the largest single non Empire trading partner in 1931. 
Table 12 Imports (Kenya and Uganda) ; 
1925 1927 1929 1931 1933 1925 1947 
Japan $ 3.8 4.15 5.7 8.5 12.9 15.1 0.7 
U.S. A .55 8.9 10,7 12.7 q.9 A. 3 7.6 14.9 
Out of the total: % 31.09£ 36.0 40.07 36.8 36.6 41.0 32.0 
(Source: OES 1937, Ibid). 
This table shows how the war was to temporarily destroy Japan's 
tlireat to the East African market, and. how the U.S.A. was able to reap the 
benefits after the war, when it replaced Japan as the major non-Empire 
supplier. The U.S.A. was mainly concerned before and after the war with 
supplying technical and engineering gooes to the East African market i.e. 
motor vehicles, oil, petrol, kerosene and tyres. These articles were in 
direct competition with similar goods from British firms , whereas the 
Japanese challenge affected not only Britain but also the other Empire 
territories (India for instance), particularly in the field of low cost 
enamelware and cotton goods. 
±i) Exports: 
The throe territories of East Africa relied almost entirely on 
primary products for export before the Second World War. The following show 
57. Article, Buy British, in East African Standard Newspaper,14/l/28«, 
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fabrics, to controlling over 70o of this market by 1935 thereby largely 
displacing Britain, India and Holland as the former suppliers of this product. 
By 1937, therefore, apart from exporting large quantities of cotton and silk 
piece goods to the East African markets at competitive prices, Japan was 
also supplying cement, clothes, bcctq and shoes, .aitd .enamelware. Japan.had, 
of course, achieved this penetration of the East African markets by under-
cutting the established suppliers, such as Britain. An example of such tactics 
can be found in tho following comparative costs for production of glass plate 
and steel* 
av. c.i.fo prices per cwt. UK ... 26/-
t? " Japan 10/9 
(these prices were also well below those of any of Japan's other competitors). 
A similar picture can be observed in china were and porcelain; 
UK S.lOl/- (av. c.i.f. per cwt) 
Japan 20/- (" 5V 1000) 
and tiles: UK 225/- (av. c.i.f. per 1000) 
Japan 69/- " 5; " 
(Source: Report of Economic and Commercial conditions in British E. Africa 
1937-30, Department of Overseas Trade). 
In glassware also Japan predominated, having ousted Britain as the main 
supplier of this product in the 1920s. 
Tablo 11 
Major Importa ..of.glassware into K;nya and Uganda* 
1936 Jo 1937 Jk 
UK £ 7,339 25 0,573 22 
Belgium 1,644 / 0 2,519 6 
Germany 3,009 13 5,«03 15 
Japan 13,314 45 17,145 44 
Total 29,126 30.943 
(Source: Colonial Trale Accounts) 
This threat from the East to British and Empire"predominance in the East 
African market did not go unobserved in Britain. In 1920 Ormsby-Gore, the 
Secretary of State, was being closely Questioned in the Rouse of Commons 
the matter of Japanes trade with the Colonies in East Africa. Mr. Hannon( o 
asked, the Secretary of State for the Colonies whether the government as 
that an economic commission appointed by the Japanese Government had recen 
visited Kenya and Uganda, with the object of extending Japanese trade in 
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colonies and furthermore, 'having regar. to the loan commitments of this 
country to Ceny^ in. Uganda, whether he will devise measures to safeguard 
British export trade to British Cast .frici against the competition of Japan 
and other countries? Ormsby—Gore replied in the affirmative to the first part 
of the question but when it came to protection he asserted the Imperial 
Government's policy at that time, lUl Government ire anxious to foster British 
export trade to the territories concerned - .and would welcome suggestions. 
But it would be inconsistent vrith existing international obligations to 
extend any preferential treatment to goods of British origin imported into 
57 these territories*. '' 
Another country to take a large proportion of the Bast \frican . 
import trade from 1925-1937 was U.S.A._ which was in fact ahead, of Japan until 
it was ousted as the largest single non Empire trading partner in 1931» 
Table 12 Imports (Kenya and Uganda) • 
1925 1927 1929 1931 1933 1925 1947 
Japan # 3.8 4.15 5.7 8.5 12.9 15.1 0.7 
U. S .A 8.9 10,7 12.7 q.9 A. 3 7.6 14.9 
Out of the total; % 31.09£ 36.0 40.07 36.8 36.6 41.0 32.0 
(Source: OES 1937, Ibid). 
This table shows how the war was to temporarily destroy Japan's 
threat to the East African market, .and how the U.S.A. was able to reap the 
benefits after the war, when it replaced Japan as the major non-Empire 
supplier. The U.S.A. was mainly concerned before and after the war with 
supplying technical and engineering goo. ; to the East African market i.e. 
motor vehicles, oil, petrol, kerosene and tyre3. These articles were in 
direct competition with similar goods from British firms , whereas the 
Japanese challenge affected not only Iritain but also the other Empire 
territories (India for instance), particularly in the field of low cost 
enamelware and cotton goods. 
i>j) Exports; 
The three territories of East Africa relied almost entirely on 
primary products for export before the Second World War. Hie following show 
57. Article, Buy British, in East African Standard Newspaper, 14/l/28e 
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Table 13 Principal Exportsfrom Kenya, 1937; 
& f 
Coffee 732,263 18.8 
Sisal 673,719 17.3 
Tea 466,872 12.0 
Gold 415,967 10.7 
fiaize 198,832 5.1 
Total Exports: 3,888,320 
(Sources O.E.S.). 
The following table shows the main countries to which Kenya and Uganda 
exported. 
Table 14 Direction of Exports from Kenya, 1923-33 . 
1923 1925 1927 ' 1929 1931 1933 
UK £ 47.1 56.4 47.4 36.9 36.6 35o6 
Britain Poss. 36.7 27.0' 23.2 - 35.2 /:1.1 42.3 
Tot;il Britain + Empire 83.8 84.2 70.6 72.1 77.7 77.9 
Others: Belgium 4 .9 3 . 5 5.0 6.2 4.9 3.0 
Japan 1.7 2.1 11.2 10.6 3.3 7.9 
U.S.A. 2.2 1 . 3 1 . 4 2.3 4.6 1 . 6 
Total Others: 16.2 15.8 29.4 2.7.9 22.3 22.1 
1 
(Sourcc: Annual Trade Accounts for 1933). 
Britain, once again is of declining importance as a destination for East 
Africa's export;;. The non Empire 'foreign* group takes a small, although 
increasing proportion of the exports of Kenya and Uganda. 'Hiile the share 
of Empire is increased, that of Britain decline' absolutely over this ten 
year period. Japan is also their largest non Oraoire receiver of East Africa 
exports, although its percentage of the total trade remained relatively sir;- 11 
at eight per cent in 1933. Indeed, in 1928 the familiar concern was eman 
from the House of Commons when in March some Labour members queried the 
expenditure on East African cotton growing made by the 3npire Cotton Growi 
Association on the groun -s that Britain was in fact subsidising a 'foreign 
competitor: the Japanese. Figures quoted luring this debate showed that 
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uring the first nine months of 1927 nearly one quarter of the cotton exported jr rV 
from Mombasa was consigned to Japan.J They went on to suggest that Japanese 
steamers were carrying East African cotton free of freight charges, being 
subsidised for their purpose by the Japaneso Government. During 1926, they 
claimed, 99,281 centals out of 790,740 centals of cotton exported from the 
3.A. dependencies were consigned to Japan. One would not be particularly 
surprised at this fact, as were the MP's , but their main cause for concern 
was that cotton growing in East Africa was subsidised through public funds 
via the Unpirc Cotton Growing Association. Tho President of the Board of 
Trade in reply, stated that the probable reason for Japan taking such a 
large share was that the freight rate from Kenya to Japan was lower than from 
East Africa to Britain, thirty two and forty shillings per cubic i.e. foot 59 respectively. 
The overall trading position of East Africa in relation to inter-
national markets was becoming more competitive and Britain's 'Laissez-faire' 
system of the interwar years meant that her manufactured goods had to face 
increasingly tough competition from countries such as J ipan and the United 
States, in colonial markets. As we have seen, Kenya's tariff structures 
favoured protection of local industries, and the duties on manufactured 
goods applied equally to British goods and those of other nations. The 
ultimate response of many British firms after tho Second War was to go behind 
the tariff wall and actually produce goods within Kenya under protected 
conditions. 
Table 15; Countries of Origin of Imported Trade Goods to Uganda <g. Kenya; 
1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1947 
GB & N.Ireland 38.3 34.6 37.0 44.3 44.5 39.3 38.3 37.6 37.0 39.7 
Brit Poss. 25.6 27.6 23.1 20.4 18.6 24.1 15.1 23.3 22.0 28.2 
Total Brit Empire 63.9 62.2- 60S1 64.7 63.1 63.4 63.4 60.9 59.0 67.9 
58. Article, Japanese Competition for East African Cotton, (EAS) in 
Macmillan Library. (3113128). 
59. Ibid. 
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Table 15 (Cont)s 
1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 mk 1935 19J _ 
Belgium 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.0 1.4 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.9 3.6 
Butch E.Ind. 2.1 2.2 3®3 3.6 2.6 3.4 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.4 
Germany 4® 6 4® 4 4® 6 3.4 3.2 2.6 3®1 3.5 4® 4 -
Holland 4® 9 5.4 5.1 4.0 4® 3 3®9 3®4 1.4 0.9 1.4 
.Japan 4.1 4.5 5.7 3.3 8.6 11.0 12.9 15.0 15® 2 0.7 
U.S.A. 10.8 11.3 12.0 10.3 19.0 5® 3 4®3 6.1 7.6 14.9 
Persia 2.1 2.4 1.6 2.0 1.9 2.5 2.9 4.1 4.3 5.5 
Foreign (. Other) 5.0 6.3 6 a. 1,1 5 9 6.1 6 4 5.6 5- 3 7 * 
Grand Tot Foreign; 36.0 37.8 39-9 35®3 36.9 36.6 3606 39.1 41.0 34.9 
Total £: 1927 1920 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 
781611 8747777 8920579 6923665 5092665 4662859 4898722 5708025 66413? 
Part IV INTjRNATIOHAL CAPITAL. -
In this p irt the intention in to show the nature and extent of the 
penetration of foreign capital into East Africa, and Kenya Colony in particul .r 
before the Second Torld War. A generil analysis of foreign companies operatin 
in these territories will be followed by a detailed case study on three diffe 
rent types of company. Case studies are necessary in order to show the 
mochanisms of capitalism and the competition between the capitals, but the 
general outline of the numbers and types of firms within each area of 
investment, serve to set these case studies in context. The companies will 
be divided into throe areas of investment, (see Table 16) the first being 
•Food & Beverage Processing, and Estates', the second, being 'Trading* and 
the last being 'Manufacturing <?• ftlnerals'. The average size of the foreign 
companies in table (17) for which issued capital is available, is £665,726 
(for 1945 )• Tliis gives some indication of the larger size of foreign 
investment comp.ired with the local firms in section two| where the Public 
Companion' average issued capital was £396,083 (there is some overlap of 
firms with the foreign firms) and Z 97,068 for Private Companies."0 
60. The large size of paid - up capital for the Foreign firms is, < 
course, biased in that there are so few companies forming the average! 
nine in 1945, (see table 17 ) „ 
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There will naturally be sone overlap of the firms in different 
activity groupa in Table (16) , as .tor instance most trading companies by 1939 9 
owned estates and some even manufacturing concerns, however they are divided 
according to their similar nodes of operation. In both parts of this section on 
international capital, uhc loci;a :all be on those companies operating in 
Kenya before 1939? although in the ease studies rigid time boundaries will 
not be adhered to. Tho purpose of this loose tire span being to follow the 
mechanism by which competition exerts pressure on merchant capital, which 
causes it to invest directly into production, thereby becoming industrial 
.. , 61 capital. 
The proceeding discussion of trade and company formation clearly 
shows that the basis for accumulation in. the Colony before the Second War 
was agriculture and ancillary concerns„ What has emerged, is that apart 
from small scale processing, such as cotton ginning, sisal spinning, coffee 
and tea manufacture, factory prcduction was not very significant in the three 
East Afri an territories before 1945 o Such manufacturing as did exist was 
designed to provide commodities and services for only a small Asian and 
European population, and a small, although increasingly large proportion of 
wage earning Africans. The products that were manufactured locally for these 
communitie.' included; flour, fats, sugar, soap, beer jams, tobacco, 
cigarettes, and adneral waters. However it is important to bear in mind that 
the 'home production' of those articles had in none of these commodities 
62 
(excluding toa and coffee) ouvtod tho imported equivalent by 1939? 'and the 
East African colo.ai.es we^o still houvaly dependent or. imports mfinly from 
Britain. It is appropriate at. this point to turn to those agencies or arms 
of British merchant capital that wore to cater for such demand. 
Trade Companies; 
British trading and shipping companies quickly recognised the 
potential offered by new and expanding markets, in East Africa. The largest 
of these companies operating in the East African territories between 1906 and. 
1920s were, Smith MacKen^io(lr1chc;.pe Grci p), 3aumann & Co, Gibson find Co, 
Leslie and Anderson, British East Africa Corporation, and Mitchell Cottss 
(see table 16). These companies were all concerned with exporting primary 
61. Brooke Bond is an example of this tr.echord.sm, as we shall see in 
the case study. 
62. This contention is borne out by the Colonial Trade Accounts for tho 
inter-war years. 
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produce from East Africa in return for importing and distributing manufac—• 
tured goods from Europe and America, By the 1930s Smith Mackenzie (and 
its subsidiaries), A, Baumann & Go, and Mitchell Cotts -rere probably the 
largest in terms of the value of the goods which they handled. How did they 
come to invest in East Africa? 
Mitchell Gotts was a leading South African merchant and shipping 
organisation. Shipping and coaling were the two main activities of the 
63 
company at the time of entry into East Africa in 1926.^ The first shipping-
branch was established at Mombasa in 1926, extended to Nairobi in 1927, and 
Kitale in 1928. By 1932 they were able to establish themselves as the sole 
contractors for the supply of South African coal bo the Kenya and. Uganda 
railways, and they supplied over 100,000 tons in 1932.^ The tactic of eaclh .one 
of these firms was to establish a monopoly of/particular branch of production. 
Mitchell Cotts rapidly established their pre-eminence in the import and expert 
trade through particular commodities. As we have said, their chief import 
into East Africa was coal. The primary exports, over which they had gained. 
.v •s/af'MS'a by^ .1/-1 K-y 1-03/3, toi^ -A/tyiA, rcrri. mnajz^ .» r^/crj tirst c^ -tA1/. V^rif^ cig'n z>Vv£iJIii.'£-cil 
manoeuvering) to obtain the sole agency for the export of Kenya Farmers' 
Association (KFA) products. There is evidence that in this capacity Mitchell 
Cotts handled no less than 95* of naize export between 1928 and 1932, and 
in 1932 they also handled 95. of the wheat crop. The nature of this control 
over exports was pervasive, as this extract from their annual report of 1932 
showst "...,we hanlle exclusively their (KF'y) exports grain from the time it 
th» commission on this to London is receivea on rail to the time it is sold in London/alone from 1928-1V32 
accounted to about £10,000. In cases where ships are chartered, this naturally 
brings us agency fees and bunker orders,and in turn this assists our coal 
bunkering operations. London .also earns buying commission on all KFA's • ••'• 
wants".00 
63. The move of Mitchell Cotts into East Africa was part of an overall 
drive to extcn ' their area of operation from South Africa, along the Indi.an 
Ocean Shipping routes. Kenya was ideal from this point of view, as well as c 
offering outlets for .raw materials m- m.arkets for imports. 
64. Report by H.B. Hamilton, a general manager of Mitchell Cotts ir 
the 1920's in' '30's, en the company's business in East .frica, (Mitchel 
Cotts Company records for 193--, in Cotts House, Nairobi). 
65. Ibid. 
66. Ibid. 
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On a much smaller scale they were ilso involved in the coffee 
trade, in\ had set up maize and coffee mills at Kitale in 1928. As far as 
the import tr -de was concerned the company held a wide variety of agencies 
for manufactured goods, such as weighing machines of Messrs. Pooley & Sons, 
and products of the Californi Spray Chemical Corporation, such as insecti-
cides for tho coffee growers in 3ast Africa. In 1933, Mitchell Cotts East 
Africa was incorporated as a wholly o-med subc-iiliory of i'fi-tchell Cotts & Co. 
Ltd., (who by this time had their head office in London). In 1936 the 
company added sisal to their list of primary products for export and in that 
year they purchase'1 an existing ; ettler sisal estate at Ruiru, East African 
Sisal Estates Ltd. In 1933 they also acciuired Simpson and Whitelaw, a local 
67 
settler firm of grain seed merchants. Thus the Mitchell Cotts Group in 
East Africa consolidated through expansion in their oim enterprises, and 
through the purchase of existing local firms involved in primary products. 
Their interests in primary production were enhanced after the Sccond 'far when 
they moved on a large scale into pyrothrum processing (working through state 
marketing bodies). In 1950 they bought out 1 settler tea company, known as 
Mekong Estates, which became 'Nandi Tea Estates Ltd*. However, despite these 
diverse activities before the war, the company relied for the bulk of its 
revenue on its coaling .and shipping and freight carriage. 
The British East Africa Corporation (BEA Ltd) was one of the 
oldest established trading companies in East Africa, and was to join the Z rt 
Mitchell Cotts Empire, after the Second. War in 1946. Tho BEA Corporation 
was incorporated in England in .1906 by a syndicate with interests in the 
East African territories. From the outset they acted as agents for and 
were closely associated with the Cotton Growing Association who wanted to 
encourage tho cultivation of cotton in order to ensure supplies of raw material 
to British manufacturers of cotton goods. This agency was tho foundation of 
the BEA Company in East Africa, md lasted from 1906 to 1914» when 'some 
serious differenced arose betvrccn the BEAC and the Association over the 69 
method of financing cotton purchased by the Corporation. However by 1914 
the BEA Company were '.well accuaintod with conditions in the East Africa 
market.and had invested directly in primary production covering a wide range 
of commodities; they owned or managed estates concerned -dth cultivating sisal, 
67. The Mitchell Cotts Group in East Africa, Royal Show Supplement,1952, 
in the Kenya Weekly News, (Macrnillan Library). 
68. Ibid. 
69. Annual Reports of the British Cotton Growers' Association, 1907—1914, 
(from the Jfi.tch.oll Cotts Company records, Cotts House, Nairobi). 
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wattle, and owned numerous cotton ginneries. They also had many agencies 
for manufactured goods in East '.frica. In 1939} the company was completely 
re-organisod. an..' registration transferred to Tonya. In 1946 all these primary 
processing and trading agencies wore acquired by the Mitchell Cotts Group, 
as part of its post war drive towards consolidation. 
Smith Mackenzie established in 1909 was .mother well known shipping 
agency that was concerned with warehousing and shipping, as well as importing 
rnanuf icturod goods into East Africa. The mechanisms behind the development 
of this company are so similar to tho proceeding two, that we .-ill not be 
concerned to delineate its activities in East Africa. 
Gailey and. Roberts does not fall into tho same category as the other 
trading firms, as it was not conccrncd. with exporting of primary commodities, 
but rather/provided a servicing an' importing function. Gailey & Roberts is 
an example of a locally established firm which was absorbed by international 
capital. James H. Gailey and D.O. Roberts were surveyors employed by the 
railway in 1904, who recognised the need for tools and equipment for the 
carl.y settlers. J unes Gailey was known to have said, 'If Delamere persuades 
settlers to take up land here, they (the settlors) will need ploughs, spades, 
70 
buckets, nails, and building materials® In response to the demand for 
such items of equipment and servicing, they set up an engineering workshop 
in Nairobi in 1904—5° Before the First 'Tar they enlarged the existing workshop 
-and acquired .another settler company, the Nairobi Engineering Company. 
Gailey and Roberts concentrate'- on offering service after sales, which meant 
the engagement of technical staff . .  well as tho import of the necessary 
equipment. During the years between the company's formation and the 1930s 
the bulk of the company's work was in supplying machinery to farmers, but 
they also secured contracts to equip whole factories in Kenya and. Uganda 
71 with machinery. 
The company had expanded fast. In 1926 the paid up capital was 
£13»504, and in 1930 it was £133,142. However by the mid 1930s the company 
needed more capital for expansion, and one of their main suppliers of agri-
cultural ..aid engineering equipment , the-United- Africa Corporation (UAC) ; 
70. Article, Tho History of Gailey aid Robert^ in Kenya, (EAS, 1?/ 
71. Ibid. 
72. The United Africa Corporation was a direct trading subsidiar -
Unilever Company in Britain, an- it established offices in Kenya durin 
1920's. 
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iccuired 100^ of the share capital, on the death of one of the partners. 
This Unilever subsidiary had thus managed to gain a direct stake in a most 
important- 'industry' in the Colony: that of servicing and supply of agri-
cultural eeuipment. Naturally with infusion of international capital and 
technical expertise, the company expanded rapidly. By 1938, the year after 
the UAC takeover, the company's turnover in Kenya alone totalled £373,750, 
and the goods imported on the company's account consisted of four percent 
of the total imports of Kenya and Uganda. By 1952, with total imports into 
Kenya of over £100,000,000, the turnover of Gailey and Roberts had increased 
to over £2,500,000. and by 19o0 the company was achieving a £5,000,000 turnover 
annually. 
Apart from Gailey and Roberts the trading firms investing in 
Bast Africa before the war exhibited characteristics in common- they were 
all concerned with exchanging commodities on an international level. As well 
as simply dealing in these commodities, these companies invested directly 
in the means of production, such as sisal ciiltivation, or coffee growing 
and curing. As the competition amongst merchant companies was so intense, 
these firms were really left with no option but to actually produce the 
73 
primary product that they exported. The longer case studies will, bear 
out this argument in much more detail. 
Food, Beverage and Estates ; 
These firms were concerned with exploiting one p. rticular commodity 
exclusively in which they had a global interest. ue will take a few examples 
from Table (16) All these companies except the sisal company? were concerned 
with processing agricultural products. However the establishment of manufac-
turing plants was in most cases preceded by a trading branch, through which 
that company had traded in tea, meat products, or tobacco, etc. Processing 
plants were usually set up by such companies in response to the international 
conditions of p-oduction of that commodity, and competition for the internal 
market. The British Imperial Tobacco Company (BAT) for instance, set up a 
trading branch in East Africa for the distribution of its tobacco products 
as early as 1907. From this date they encouraged the growth of the tobacco 
crop (particularly in Uganda) in order to export the raw material for 
manufacture in Britain. It became obvious that in order to avoid competition 
73. Hence the purchase of cotton and sisal estates by the Tanganyika 
Cotton Company (TANCOT) in the 1930's and Mitchell Cott's purchase of a 
large settler owned sisal estate in 1936. 
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1) 
with other imported tobaccos an' cigarettes (such as Rothmans). 1 it was 
necessary to manufacture in the territories themselves. In 1934 • East 
African Tobacco Co, constructed its first factory in Uganda to process tobacco 
and cigarettes mainly for the expanding local market. Tobacco was not manufac-
tured in Kenya by the BAT group until 1954, largely bee-,use the size of the 
Kenyan crop did not merit the construction of a factory. 
The reason for Brooke Bond's entrv into Kenya are similar and 
stemmed from a desire to grow and manufacture tea in the Colony in order to 
oust their competitors from the East \frican market, which was a small one. 
It • also reflected the need of the Brooke Bond and the James Finlay Company 
to secure alternative growing areas to offset the perceived instability of 
the India and Ceylonese producing area, (see case study for a fuller 
exposition). 
The manufacture of beer on the other hand was already undertaken 
by several small settler firms, although the largest producer of beer by 
1930 was East Africa Breweries, .formed, in 1922, It was partly owned locally 
ind partly owned and managed by the British brewing concern Ind Coope Ltd, 
The only foreign firm to be assisted by the state during this period 
was Liebigs meat processing factory. The Colonial Government in Kenya and 
of 
the Liebig company jointly financed th" construction /a meat processing plant 
at Athi River, south of Nairobi, in 1935° Leibigs had wanted to find an 
.•alternative supplv to Rhodosion meat in Africa, and Kenya seemed to offer 
conducive conditions, particularly as the state ha1 an interest in promoting 
such an enterprise, The factory was to export a certain amount of chilled meat 
from the settler firms and process 'native' cattle for beef extracts, corned 
beef, and beef powder for the export market. The government guaranteed the 
company that a certain ouot a of c attic woul' bo delivered to the factory each 
month and government 'e-stocking ordinances were to enforce this throughput 
of cattle. *rot only were the interests oa the settlers being served by 
finding export markets for their meat, but the st ite had wanted ran excuse to 
destock particul irlv the Kamba herds as they considered that the land in 
Ukambani was being seriously overgrazed. Those moves were opposed most 
strongly by the 'fakamba cattle pro-'ueers, who resisted successfully 
74. The British American mobacco Company's subsidiary in Kenya, the 
East African Tobacco Company Wis to finally take over Rothmon's marketin? 
organisation in 1967, after bitter competition. 
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for several years. This meant th >t the \thi liver f actory was not able to 
function it anything like full capacity for some years. Leibigs were in fact 
to manage the f tctory and market the products of tho meat plant until the 
late 1960's when the Kenya Meat Commission was completely 'locilised'. 
Wattle trees ha been cultivated in 'enyn since the early 1900*3 and there had 
'aveloped since that time an export trade in bark to tho European manufacturers 
of wattle extract. During the 1930's wattle commodities (ie. bark anl extract) 
accounted for between 5-8^ of total export commodities (by value). Wattle 
was grown on estates and also a a 'household commodity' amongst \frican farmers 
By the late 19-0's several small extract factories had been established in 
Kenya by settlers an-1 Asian capital. Tho most prominent wattle extract 
factory by 1930 was tho Kenya Tinning and Extract Company by the name of 
Premchand Raichan Another Local settler company had also started pro luction 
75 at Limuru and closed down in 1930. 
International capit 1, in the form of the Forestal Land and Timber 
Company came to take direct interest in Kenyan wattle pro luction when it 
accuired control of the Natal Tinning and Extract Company ( n South African 
firm), which itself controlled tho BEA "attle Estates at Kikuyu m d East African 
Tanning and Extract Compiny at Eldoret. During the 1920's, 8CP? of all wattle 
products were destined for European markets of which Britain constituted 
50<?• (for extract). Thus the rationale behind Forestal's need to move into 
Kenyan wattle production was that is should pre-empt supplies of bark reaching 
its Europe in competition in extract manufacture. Also international 
conditions of production in this commodity made it necess ary for Forestal 
to control the wattle supply in Kenya. For the growth of wattle bark pro- -
/quebrachc 
uction in South Africa md Xeny: had seriously threatened the use of '* • * ..» 
the other major tanning material. 1?orestal was therefore concerned to 
control the wattle producing areas, as well as to try halting tho flow of 
wattle bark to its competitors in Eurone. A prolonged struggle was to take 
place in Kenya between Forestal and local firms (both merchVahd industrial) 
before Forestal was able to enforce its hegemony over wattle production 76 
through all its stages. ' 1,rc will not discuss further the nature of this 
struggle, as it Trill be drawn out in the case studies. 
There wore also several foreign owned sisal plantations that 
exported raw sisal to Europe in manufacturers of twine, such as the Anglo-
75. For a fuller exposition sou M.P. Cowen, Wattle Production in the 
Central Province, op. cit. 
76. Ibid. 
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French Sis-l Company and the Cast frican Siso.1 Estates (which was taken 
over by 'titchell Cotts in 1936). 
The examples given of primary manufacturing companies have made th< 
general point cle <r — that there was a move to manufacture within a primary 
producing territory such as Fast 'frica and this largely stemmed from the 
competitive conditions existing in the world wide production of commodities. 
M rnuf acturing and diner air; s 
Aa wo have indicated ounce... manufacturing in Fast Africa 
before the Second "orld 'far was finn&t\e processing of raw materials .and. 
agricultural products. The major significant mineral (apart from gold which 
was short-lived), to be exploited in Kenya before 1945, was soda ash. The 
struggle for control of one of the world's richest deposits of soda ash will 
be -analysed in the case study on the Magadi Soda Company. 
The generation of power c m be regarded as a 'manufacturing* 
activity in the non-agricultural sector. Power was an essential service in 
77 
the development of all three territories. therefore, as early as 1906 
the Mombasa dlectric Light an ' Power Company was formed by the Esmailjee 
Jiv an.jee Company of Momo isa in partnership with some European engineers. The 
first power installation in the Nairobi area was in 1907 '"'hen a hydro-electric 
station v s erected. . t Ruiru using three 130 kw, turbines. Nairobi grew so 
fast that soon additional installations were constructed with two 120 kw type 
steam generators at Parkland*. Lack of capital for further developments 
prompted the formation of a London loard of this company, which was re-consti-
tute'' as the :Sast .frican Power .and Lighting Company (based in London) in 1922 
The chairman of this company was JG Stone, o well known pioneer of India and 
Colonial Supply Undertakings. During 1929 licences were obtained by the EAPL 
to purchase the Tanganyika Electric Supplv Company, which provided power 
supplies for Dar es Sal * am ind other ireas. Licences were obtained to supply 
Kampala, Entebbe and Jinja an' the first power was produced there by East in 
Afric in Power an1 Lighting A93& (the government took over E'vPT, in Uganda after 
the Second '*orld Tar). Hie Comp an1'" therefore ha1 a virtual monopoly of power 
generating in Tanganyika, Uganda an1 Conya until after 1945.'8 
77* Electric power is .an example of an essential service which moves 
from local to foreign control, due largely to the need for large amounts of 
capital and technology "or such an enterprise. 
78. Article, 'Cast African Power an-' lighting, in EAS, 5/5/65. 
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ifter 19 4, the comp my became associated with Power Securities Ltd 
79 
and Balfour Boittv -nd Co. inr these two companies provided the technical 
assistance and management services for the EAPL in Kenya until 1970 when 
the company was nationalised. Balfour Beatty .and Po rer Securities were linked 
through directorship nd shareholding, and had been involved in electricity 
supply and development ince the turn of the century. Due to the specialised 
nature of po'-'or generation, this partnership wis able to achieve a monopoly 
over power supplies in the East Afric an territories. 
V 'partial' industrial process wis to be found before the Second 
World War in the cement grinding mill that was set up as the 'East African 
Portland Cement Company' by the Tunnel Cement Company of UK uid Yssociated 
Portland Cement (the cement distributors Smith Mackenzie Baumanns and African 
80 
Mercantile Company also took a small share of Z 20,000 each. This mill did 
not manufacture cement through all its stages, but rather ground clinker that 
•ras the basi" of the cement mixture. The reason for this partial 'import 
substitution' wis that there had been i desire on tho side of the distributors 
as well as the suppliers of cement to East African to cut the costs of freight 
which this mill achieved as clinker could bo carried as ballast in ships. 
It is therefore plain that the extent of non—.agricultural manufac-
turing in Kenya before 1945 was limited, although a certain measure of import 
substitution' in primary products had been achieved. 
79. EAS, Ibid. 
80. Erom m interview with Eric Baumann in June 1975« 
31. The high cost of freight for manufactured cemont when imported 
intg East Africa meant that the profit margins -ore <~'uite low for both 
suppliers and distributors. Hence there existed a motive for some measure of 
'import substitution'. However, cement -as not fully manufactured from 
limestone ithin Kenya until 1953. 
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""••hie 16; The Princi-rl foreign R - pod Companies in ven," n before 1945 
rv-te M"me of Firm Business Country of Oripin " 
Parent Co. 
^OODj BF^FRAnF, P F^TA/PE^ 
i?rr E-'nt A.fric 11 Breweries Beer Tnd Goooe, TTK 
19 ?h African 7-Tighl°n Produce T-mes FLnl-v, ttk0 
Co 
19^4 Kenya ^e^ Comp-nv T'e- " Coffee Brooke "kin % T"r. 
1931 Anglo French Si" 1 Co Sis 1 Pl-nt-tion" Rritish/French. 
1907 E-^ ot Afric n ,pob~cco Co Tohcco Tr^din*? 
1934) V To7 cco Cic-rettes •"riti^ h American mob cc 
(rrrnO (RAT\ ttK 
193" F-st African ^-nninr ,r "ttlo-^-rk 1 rj-fl i^nning -n-" 
p. Extract " Ertr" ct Extr-ct 
r) Porest"i Lm-7 --n 1 
"im^er,. fTT70 
1935 Leibigs/Keny' Govt fe t processing Leibigs, fTTK) 
1936 FA Fis-l St-ten Ltd Sir-l nro 'uction "fitchell Cotts, (TTT0 
19^6 B.E.A. Co M-info "gents, exporters Mite hoi]. Cotts (TTTC) 
of '"'rim T 7 Produce - nfter 1945, 
TRADING 
1929 Bird f Co (Africa) Ltr1 ferch^nts, Tr-nrnorte] s "ir1 •<•-. Co, (ITK) 
0hipping, Freight, 
V "rehousing 
19 2"1 Gibson <"• Go '''n" "cents,evrrorter" 
of Prim"r""" Produce — 
co"fee, wattle ptc Gibson Co, (Tn0 
1934 '•oll^ n • AfricLinn c>hiooinr ^rehoufin* Poll-n-1 
1924 G"iley "n^ Robertr T iport -nrT Dirtri^ o"f United A fric Co 
Agricultural Tchiner"* (nhilever) W 7 
etc. 
1JA CT'TRXUG ''ER LB (exclu in™ foo ' ord-
cosfing) 
1911 M-y- 'i ""or1 G o w n v Ltd F,-*tr - ction of ^od- 1' F.African S-Ti-'ic-to 
19 "3) t/owr <•1 I.C.I. TTTr 
19 rr E^st African poT.rnr "°ower Securities r 
Lightior •^en^r-tion of nowor E" If our ^dt." 
1933 F-nt Afric n portl-n1 Cnnnt Clinker Appoci~ted Portland 
Cement Grinding Cement (UK) 
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- ,;)lc 17: Size of some Foreign Firmr by Paid-Up Capital, 
Dite N.-Jie of Ftrr. Issuoc Capital 
1 i Food, Bevorago, an1 Estates. 1930 £ 
1922 Cast African Breweries 2,085 
1924 Afric ui Highlands Produce (f) n.a. 
1924 Kenya To 1 Company (Brooke Bon') 50,000 
1931 ] Anglo—French Sisal Company n.a. 
1907 Ea. t Ifrican Tobacco Comp.my n.a. 
1932 last Ifrican Tanning 8. 
Extract Company 
60,000 
1935 Leibigs n« a. 
1936 East African Sisal Estates 10,000 
Trading. 
1920 Sir-' & Company n. a. 
1920 Gibson ° Company n.a. 
1906 British East Africa Company n.a. 
(1939 - reconsituted) 
1924 Godley .and Roberts 133,142. 
1934 Holland Africa Li.no (f) n. a. 
Manufac- turing & Minerals 
1911 Magadi Soda Company (ICI) 
(reconstituted 1923) 
597,141 
1922 ' East African Power & Lighting 
1 Company 
570,000 
1933 , E :t Ifrican Portland Cement 
Company 
i 
35,000 
la sued' Capital 
1?45 £ 
70,637 
n«a 
150,000 
n.a. S.Oo 
n.a. aiOa 
477,201 
n.a. S.Oo 
20,000 
n.a0 S.O 
n.a. SoO 
/:7,410 
146,692 
n.a. 
796,260 
4,213,333 
70,000 
TOTAL AVAIIABLS 
ISSUED SHIRS CAPITAL: 
1,457,368 5,991,533 
AVERAGE SHARE C PITAL Z , 102,171 665,726. 
PER COMPANY s 1 
( Sources the Registrar General of Companies) 
n.a. - not available. 
3.0. - the company has been struck off the register, 
(f) - branch of a foreign company. 
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PART V: CASE STUDIES: INTLRiiAT'ION"AL CAPITAL 
Three case studies'have'been selected,'one'from each group in 
table (16). They are not identical in content and style and each emphasis' : 
a"different aspect of capitalist expansion. One theme that is dravm out 
in all three studies,, is the neeu of both merchant and industrial capital 
at a particular stage of development, to control the conditions of 
production in certain commodities., in this case soda and tea. 
The study on the trading company, A. Baumann and Company places 
stress on the need of merchant capital to diversify into manufacturing 
after' the Second World War. The study of Magadi Soda Company shows how 
international conditions of production dictated the consolidation of 
firms manufacturing soda products on a global level, as well as the need 
for this conglomerate to control the East African area of production. 
The Brooke Bond study, on the other hand is long and concentrates in some 
detail on the competitive conditions surrounding tea production in Kenya 
before the war. The focus of the this competition during the 1930's and 
1940's is on the methods used by the International Tea Committee (ITC) 
in seeking to control the conditions of world tea production. t+ ..ixi 
show not onlv how k'o^ j.^ " piuuuction as a whole was fashioned according 
to the global requirements of the dominant producers, but also how one 
company, Brooke Bond, was able to effect a monopoly over internal tea 
marketing in Kenya by 1938. 
PART V(a): TRADING: A. 3AUMANN £ COMPANY 
A. Baumann, although originally a small family firm at the turn 
of the nineteenth century, emerged as one of the most important firms 
trading in primary commodities before the Second World War. During the 
1930's they dominated the trade in groundnuts in Tanganyika, wattle bark 
in Kenya and coffee and cotton seed in Uganda. 
The anatomy' of this company illustrates the conditions that 
necessitated the movement of merchant capital into manufacturing. 
Alfred Baumann, a German by birth, worked in the 1880's for the German 
firm of Declarement & Donner who were a big hides and skins dealer in 
India. In 1899 he left this firm and decided to settle in London and 
bought an existing business, Schweder 5 Co, which was also involved in 
the hides and skins trade. This firm became a registered partnership in 
London and was re-constituted as A. Baumann & Co and it continued to deal 
exclusively in hides and skins. This business was profitable, and involved 
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exporting hides and skins from India and South Africa to tanners on the 
-ontinent and in Britain; the Baumann company financed shipments which 
82 
then would either be sold direct to tanners or at the London auction. 
By 1918, with the increasing concentration of capital and 
foroation of cartels in Europe, manufacturers of this commodity were 
making direct contacts with the suppliers and the role of the middle man was 
being rendered redundant. One solution for this type of small partnership 
was for the company itself to expand into all aspects of the commodity, 
to become the supplier, the transporter and also the marketing agent. 
Alfred Baumann, therefore, examined the possibility of expanding the company' 
business into a primary producing area. J. Colinvaux, a Belgian who had 
previously worked for another British primary produce trading firm, Leslie 
and Anderson, went into partnership with Baumann to undertake this new 
venture. Colinvaux, through his former employment, realised the possibi-
lities of East Africa in supplying primary commodities, and in 1926 they 
set up a registered partnership in Kenya and opened a branch in Mombasa. 
Alfred Baumann's son, Eric Baumann was in charge of the East African oper-
ation. The latter was soon to expand to Dar es Salaam where a branch 
office was opened in 1928, and in Kampala in 193]., 
Competition for control of commodities: 
From the late 1920's when the company began its operations in 
East Africa, the Baumann partnership was mainly concerned with importing 
a range of manufactured goods from Britain such as textiles, cement, 
building materials and equipment, in return for East African primary pro-
ducts such as oil seeds, coffee, wattle bark, groundnuts, maize, mangrove 
bark chillies, beeswax etc. Most of these primary products were purchased 
from Asian traders who brought the goods to Mombasa from the up-country 
markets - but in some commodities there was a necessity for the company 
to become more involved in the actual production of these commodities. 
The two largest items of export from Uganda dealt with by the 
company in the 1930's were coffee and oil seed. This trade was not 
'captured' lightly and Baumanns came to control the trade in these 
commodities after a period of bitter competition with other British based 
trading companies. 
32. Interview with Eric Baumann (one of the first partners of the 
Kenyan firm in the 1920's), in June 19''5. 
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By the 1930's Uganda was producing considerable quantities of 
coffee following encouragement amongst African farmers by the administra-
tion since the early 1920's. In 1931, Gibson of Gibson and Co, another 
primary exporting firm in East Africa, was urged by the then Director of 
Agriculture, Tohill, to set up a processing plant for the coffee crop. 
At about the same time, Gibson and Co and Jamal Ramji Co set up coffee 
mills indepdendently to handle the crop of approximately 10,000 tons of raw 
coffee. Coffee production expanded apace and the Gibson Company 
required an infusion of capital for the construction of new coffee plants 
and a general expansion of their operations. They accordingly approached 
another East African exporting firm, Leslie and Anderson to orovide the 
loan capital, but after this company had turned down Gibson's request, 
A. Baumann & Co stepped in and agreed to finance the construction of new 
coffee mills in Uganda. This act enabled the company to out-manoeuvre 
one of its main competitors in Uganda, Leslie and Anderson, ana to give 
the company a greater degree of control over the production of this 
commodity. Baumann's, in cooperation with the Gibson Company, thus came 
to dominate the trade in Uganda for about twenty five years. Some idea 
of the amounts of coffee and value that was involved in this trade can 
83 
be estimated through the Ugandan coffee exports. 
Table 18: Exports of Coffee from Uganda Weight (cwts) Value (£'s) 
1926 32,221 £147,903 
1927 43,578 170,568 
1932 87,007 223,162 
1933 100,444 210,633 
1935 n. av. 231,000 
1937 257,938 420,483 
(Source: Colonial Trade Accounts: 1926-37) 
(Note: most Uganda coffee was exported raw before 1935). 
This table shows the huge expansion in exports of coffee which more or less 
doubles between 1935 and 1937, and it gives some idea of the scale of the 
83. Baumann controlled the largest proportion of the Uganda coffee 
trade in the 1930's. Although there are no company records to this effect 
this contention was borne out from two sources.,, firstly from my own interview 
with Eric Baumann and secondly from M. Mamdani's research in his Class Tor-
ation and politics in Uganda, (Mimeo, Dar es Salaam, 1974). 
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trade particularly when one considers +l>at Baunanns controlled the internal 
8"+ 
trade in coffee within Uganda as we .1. 
This nay have been the largest commodity in which Baumann was 
dealing, but it was not the only one. The next largest commodity in terms 
of Baumann's turnover was cotton seed in the 1930's. This was sent in 
unprocessed form to British oil manufacturers. In the 1920's Leslie and 
Anderson, Baumann's biggest competitors in East Africa, were the sole 
suppliers of Uganda cotton seed to J. Bibes of Liverpool, who used the 
cotton seed to manufacture animal feeds. Leslie and Anderson sold the 
cotton seed crop by contract that fixed the price ner ton of seed. Bibes 
were not entirely satisfied with such an arrangement, as the oil content 
of the seed tended to vary considerably, and they would have preferred to 
buy on the basis of the oil content of the seed. Colinvaux, who was in 
charge of the London Baumann's office, seized the opportunity to offer 
a more favourable purchasing contract based on the oil content of the 
cotton seed. The manufacturing firm naturally accepted the offer. 
Baumanns then reached an agreement with Leslie and Anderson, that they 
should share the cotton seed market between them, and supply East African 
cotton seed exclusively to the two largest animal feed manufacturers in 
the U.K: Unilever and Bibes. This trade was considerable and amounted to 
•about 90,000 tons of oil per annum. The slump gave a further boost to 
Baumann's control over the cotton seed trade, as the price of seed offered 
to the ginning companies was so low that Baumanns were able to buy large 
85 stocks until the prices improved. 
In the 1920's, the logical commodity for the Baumann Company to 
go into was the trade in wattle bark, given the company's previous 
connections with tanneries of hides and skins. Before 1932, Baumanns 
purchased wattle bark mainly from Asian merchants, exported it to Europe 
and sold it to European manufacturers of extract. Baumann, as a merchant 
84. More direct evidence on the Baumann Company's interest in the 
trade in commodities is not available as until 1946 the company was a 
registered Partnership in Kenya so there are no financial details or 
annual reports. Also the early records of the company have been destroyed 
over time. 
85. Interview, op.cit. 
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capital, represented a threat to industrial capital. The Forestal Land 
and Timber Company cam to control cattle extract factories in Kenya in 
the early 1930's as part of a global drive to control the conditions of 
production in this commodity. Since 1926 Baumann 5 Co had been diverting 
supplies of wattle bark to Forestr.l's European competitors in extract 
manufacture. When Forestal moved into Kenya in the early 1930's in order 
to establish extract factories and absorb this wattle bark supply, Baumann 
changed its tactics and decided to export extract instead o.f wattle bark. 
Forestal's chief competitor in Kenya for the manufacture of wattle bark 
into extract was the Asian firm, Pr^rachand Raichand, and Baumann was to 
champion the cause of this local capital in order to perpetuate its own 
8 6 share in the wattle trade. ' 
Forestal hoped to control the commodity in Kenya by forcing 
Premchand Raichand, the other manufacturer, into some agreement that would 
establish a joint share of the market which would favour the international 
company. Baumann's were strongly opposed to any kind of agreement between 
local and international capital which would exclude them. Therefore 
Baumann's urged Premchand Raichand to ',.. counter any ultra selfish 
motives on the part of Forestal, with the Government, and that .... in 
business circles Forestal's moves to readjust proportions of suDDlies of 
wattle bark to limit the issuing o*" manufacturing licences, to fix minimum 
export prices of bark and extract, and maximum purchasing prices would 
push Premchand Raichand into a position in which they will have to seek 
the active help of the Kenya Government to avoid being squeezed out of 
,87 existence'. 
However Baumann's vigorous attempts to re-orientate the terms 
of the voluntary agreement between Forestal and Premchand Raichand failed, 
due to the political pressure that Forestal, was able to exert from London 
on the Colonial Office. In 1936, the first of these agreements was conclude 
and in 1939 it was renewed for a further three years. Baumann strongly 
objected to the terms reached under which the duopsony would operate and 
they maintained that only the state could 'wrench the agreement from the 
88 ' clutch of a demon.' However, when it came to wielding power at the 
level of the Imperial Government, Forestal was in a stronger position than 
the trading company of A. Baumann, and the latter was gradually eliminated 
from the wattle extract trade in East Africa. 
86. M.P. Cowen (1975), op.cit, pp. 38-40. 
87. Ibid., p. 3L. 
88. Ibid., D. 38. 
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Baunonn's loss of control over the wattle trade coincided 
fter the Second World War with a a general decline in the prices of wattle 
extract and with the advent of synthetic tanning materials. However, 
Bauraann continued to trade can a vury small scale in wattle extract, although 
it dealt in such a wide range of commodities that the loss of one could 
be compensated for in other areas. 
. . . . . 89 The Company Fost War. Industrialisation and Di/ersification: 
After the war, high company taxation in Britain occasioned the 
transfer of all the assets of A. Baumann & Co to East Africa, and its 
subsequent incorporation as a public company on the Nairobi Stock Exchange. 
Another reason for local incorporation was to expand into new areas becausc 
as we have shown, commodity trade was susceptible to intense competition 
from other merchant capitals, and, more important, from industrial capital. 
It was in 194-8, therefore, that the company received a canital 
infusion from Steel Bros who took 25°; of the share capital of the Baumann 
Company in East Africa. This company was a British based company which 
had been concerned with teak and rice production in Asia. Changing political 
circumstances in that continent had given rise to the desire of Steels to 
find alternative outlets for investment. This comoany, which was to 
« 
expand rapidly to become a huge hold .ng company by 1975 , was eventually to 
take over the Baumann East African operation in 1973. 
As we have stressed, Baumann's main interests before the Second 
World War had been confined to importing manufactured floods and exporting 
primary products. The only exception to this had been Baumann's investment 
in a cement clinker grinding mill in 1933. Importing cement was not 
profitable due to the bulk of the commodity, so Tunnel Cement Company, the 
former British supplier of the commodity after consultation with Baumanns, 
decided to set up a small cement grinding mill in Nairobi in 1933. Baumanns, 
Smith MacKenzie and African Marine Engineering (Mitchel Cotts), who were 
the other cement agents, each took a £20,000 share in this new company, 
known as East African Portland Cement. Bnumanns were to become the sole 
90 distributors of cement from clinker in Kenya. 
89. This analysis of the Baumann Company has been taken beyond the 
Second World War in order to show the historical requirement of merchant 
companies to diversify into industry. 
90. The other two cement distributors in East Africa supplied Uganda 
=nd Tanganyika, so the East Africa market was thus broken up into three 
areas. 
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/toother of Baumann's importing agencies was Leyiand Paints 
products from Britain. There wcre problems for distributors of paint in 
East Africa, for very large stocks had to be held to cater for consumer 
demand. Competition was fierce for the rather limited pre-war markets, 
so that after 1950 negotiations began between Bauraanns and Leyiand Paints 
about the possibility of setting up a plant to manufacture paint in Kenya. 
The original plan was postponed until 1956, due to the outbreak of the 
Emergency in Kenya, but in 1956 a paint factory was constructed in Nairobi, 
as a 50/50 partnership between Leyiand Paints UK and Baumann & Co, with 
the former providing the management and technical expertise. This only 
forestalled the other competitors in the East African paints market for 
a couple of years - for between 1958 and 1960 both Sadolins and Robbialac 
had set up other paint manufacturing plants in Kenya. Similarly Baumanns 
became agents of Hall Thermotank (J.D. Hall) and distributed their items. 
After the Second World War they set up jointly with the Hall Thermotank 
Company an assembly plant and engineering workshop. However Baumanns sold 
off their portion of the business to Hall Thermotank in 1968, as this activity 
in the refrigeration business was not really compatible with their other 
interests. 
During the 1950's Baumann continued its moves towards diversi-
fication. by 1954 they had taken over Milmet Estates, .consisting of 170 
icres of coffee and a beef cattle ranch from some settlers. Also in the 
1950's the company took a 50% share in the Kenyan subsidiary of Jardine 
and Matheson, tea exporting merchants. This partnership still purchases 
tea locally, blends and exports the product. The company also owns coffee 
factories in Uganda. This diversification drive was completed in 1965 
with the acquisition of ABC Foods, another European owned firm that was 
verging on bankruptcy before Baumanns bought them out. This company 
91 manufactures a range of animal feeds. 
Baumanns had finally managed to gain access to the shipping 
and freight business when it acquired its old rival Leslie and Anderson 
and its subsidiary, Wafco Ltd in 1965. The UK company of Leslie and Anderson 
was experiencing financial difficulties and the directors aoproached 
Baumanns to request that they should take over part of the company's share 
capital. Its interests in East Africa ranged from food distribution 
91. The information on takeovers of local companies and d i v e r s i f i e d 
was obtained mainly from the annual reports of the Baumann ComDany from 
19 53-1975, and from an interview with the Company Secretary of Baumann, 
(Nairobi, August 1973). 
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•->ncies to warenousing and shipping; Baumann had been competing with 
" , 9 2 
their steamship agencies since the -930's. 
Thus, by the 1970's th<_ Baumann Company in East Africa was 
composed of a gamut of enterprises in manufacturing and agricultural 
^rodaction as well as its old interests in primary commodities. Although 
coffee remained important to the company because of their direct investment 
in coffee mills in Uganda, their investment in other primary commodities 
such as wattle had waned. 
By 1970 the Baumann Company, which had been locally based since 
1945, had the remainder of its share capital purchased by Steel Brothers 
of UK. By this time Steels was a large corporation with subsidiary concern 
in over thirty countries and in a wide variety of concerns ranging from 
housing construction to commodity trading and insurance. 
92. The Baumann Company also had plans in tho early 1960's to 
consolidate their commodity trading empire by an amalgamation with the 
Tanganyika Cotton Company, but the fortunes of the latter declined and 
the plan never reached fruition. (Tancot was taken over by Lonrho in 
1969). 
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PART V(b) CASE STUDY a MAGADI SODA COMPANY. 
In this study of the development of soda ash production in Kenya, 
we intend to show how the needs of international capital were served by 
expansion into Kenya to control the source of production of the commodity. 
In order to do this it is necessary to outline the conditions of nroduction 
that led to this concentration in the commodity on a world level. 
a) Origins of Magadi: 
Lake Magadi was first surveyed in 1900 by two Rhodesian prosDectors 
93 
by the names of Deacon and Walsh. In 1902, thinking that this claim was 
of no commercial value, these two sold the concession to C. Coles, a 
mining engineer, who in the same year re-sold the rights to the East African 
Syndicate, a London based operation involved in land development in East 
Africa. The syndicate paid Coles Rupees 11,390 for the concession, and 
proceeded to mount a full scientific expendition on Magadi Soda Lake. 
In 1903 the surveyors reported, "reckoning twenty square miles of deposit at a 94 
thickness of 4r', which represents over four million tons of raw soda1'." 
The soda samples were sent to London for testing, and the percentage of 
soda content varied between 58.9% - 69%, which by international standards 
was most certainly commercially viable. It was estimated from the results 
of these experiments that "taking the market price of soda at £4.10.s. per 
ton (f.o.r. works), the value of the refined soda ash obtained from 1 ton • 95 of natural Magadi soda would he £3.9s.' 
In 1904 a lease for the Magadi concession was drawn up between 
the Government of the Protectorate and the East African Syndicate for twenty 
years (renewable). This covered eighty-nine square miles, which included 
the lake together with the lands on the shores of the lake. The royalty 
payment by the lessee to the government was fixei at five percent of the 
96 net profits made on extraction and marketing of soda from the Lake." The 
93. There is some evidence of pre-colonial trade in salt from Magadi, 
but in this paper it has not been possible to explore the evidence. 
94. Article, Magadi Sets the Pattern for Kenya, (EAS, 27/1/61). 
95. Ibid. 
96. M.F. Hill, The. Story of Magadi Soda Company, (Published for 
I.C.I, in 1960), pp. 18-20). 
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East African Syndicate was reconstituted in 1906 as the "East Africa Soda 
and Railway Company' . The technical advisers to the company were Chance 
and Hunt of UK. The draft prospectus proposed a calcinating plant at the 
junction of the branch line with the Uganda Railway and to later form 
a subsidiary to erect works m UK for manufacturing soda crystals and 
caustic soda under the advice and guidance of Chance Hunt Ltd. In 1908 
the syndicate sought financial assistance from the UK Government to develon 
Magadi, but their efforts were unsuccessful. The prospectus had sought 
to arrange for the underwriting of the capital required for the project, 
but the response in London was pc.or, and in 1910 the syndicate was wound 
up and the Magadi deposits remained untapped. 
In 1911, the Magadi Soda Company was launched, underwritten by 
Marcus Samuel a Co. and the Central Mining and Investment Corporation with 
a capital of £1,312,000 (M. Samuel were selling agents for soda products 
worldwide and in 1908 had offered their services to the East African 
Syndicate as sole selling agents for Magadi Products, a plan which came 
97 
to naught as the deposits were undeveloped). Clearly the first task 
of trie new company was to establish contact between Magadi and the outside 
world, before any exploitation of the soda resources could be effected, 
and plans were drawn up to construct a ninety one mile railway to join 
the Uganda Railway, and a water pipeline from the Npong Hills to Magadi, 
which was situated in an arid zone. This branch line, when constructed, 
would be handed over to the government and leased from them for a term 
of the new lease at a rental of five Shs. p.a. The line would be maintained 
by the Uganda Railway administration, but the costs of its construction 
was to be borne solely by the company^ the railway administration also 
undertook to provide all rolling stock sufficient to carry 160,000 tons 
of soda per year. Profits on the working of the branch line would be 
divided equally between the Uganda Railway administration and the lessees. 
Royalty oayable to the government by the company was readusted to two Shs. 
per ton of raw soda from Lake Magadi exported or sold; and if used for 
commercial purposes three Sh. per ton. of soda, or soda products. 
The attitude of the government towards the project bears out 
an earlier a point that Imperial Policy was not particularly active when 
it came to financing infrastructural developments for the exploitation 
of conmodities of industrial potential. The Uganda railway had been 
97. Article, EAS, op. cit. 
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constructed to exploit the agricultural produce of the hinterland, but 
at this stage that was the limit of their commitment to 'private enter-
• , 98 
prise'. The government, was not averse to providing generous land 
grants to companies such as Magadi, which held 2900 acres in the Masai 
reserve. 
In the initial prospectus the underwriter? of the Company, 
M. Samuel and Company, guaranteed sales of the company's product of 
'reasonable market quality' during the first five years. It stated that 
the vendors felt justified in estimating that a profit of at least 
twenty Shs. per ton of soda products could be expected. The initial 
estimated expenses of the infrastructure for the project were as follows: 
Cost of construction of the branch line — £250,000 
Nec worKS for treating and handling soda 
and water supply — £250,000 
M. Samuel & Co. surveying costs — 25,000 
Issuing expenses, underwriting -- 12 5,000 
£950,000 
99 Which left £300,000 for working capital. 
However, the importance of Magadi to the British partnership, 
consisting of the Samuel Company, the British Aluminium Company and the rem-
nants of the East African Syndicate, was to ensure that this soda deposit 
lay in their hands rather than under the control of their competitors. 
These companies involved in soda production and marketing were constantly 
on the look out for new sources of raw material as the market for soda 
products in Europe and the Far East was expanding very rapidly with 
idvancing industrialisation. In fact, the Samuel Company had purchased 
a site it Irlam on the Manchester Ship Canal in 1913, where it was proposed 
to build a factory to manufacture rustic soda and soda crystals, using 
Magadi raw soda. A further project was underway by the same company at 
Iiooghly, near Calcutta, in 1914, which was to manufacture only caustic 
soda. However, war conditions halted the progress of construction of 
these plants, and the company had to divert capital away from construction 
into supplying the Munitions Ministry from their existing caoacity. 
98. The 'infant industries' concept was not to emerge until after 
the Second World War in the Protectorate, and the attitude before that 
time was that the cost of exploiting natural resources should largely 
be borne by private enterprise, without much assistance from the state. 
This can be contrasted with the willingness of the government in the 1950'r 
tc finance the railway connecting the cement plant with the Mombasa docks 
at Bamburi. 
99. M.F. Hill, cp.cit., p. 20. 
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b) Interwar Years; Competition: 
Production at Magadi, de spite the efforts of the parent company, 
ground to a halt during the First World War, partly due to technical 
difficulties experienced at the new plant and partly due to the difficulties 
associated with shipping the commodity from Kenya to its markets. 
By the end of 1918 the existing company was facing severe financial 
difficulties: the railway had cost £1,124,000, way above the estimate, and 
the company's working capital was exhausted. Thus it was imperative 
either to raise more capital or close down the plant and wind up the London 
Magadi Company. By 1922 the company was on the verge of collapse; in 1920 
the debit on Profit and Loss was £96,832. Currency conversion in East 
Africa meant that the company's costs in Kenya were arbitrarily inflated, 
which was a blow to a company so dependent on e x p o r t s . D u r i n g the year 
1920 the output was only 12,000 tons, and further losses seemed inevitable. 
From 1920 onwards the export trade in Soda ash^"^ showed a marked 
increase due mainly to rapid expansion of sales to Japan. Magadi Soda, 
however met with severe competition from alkalis of European manufacture, 
and particularly with the products of Brunner Mond. Roscoe Brunner, the 
chairman of Brunner Mond, had been approached several times by the Magadi 
Soda Company to reach some agreement whereby this cut-throt competition 
could be controlled, but he had rejected any such arrangement. However 
Brunner Mond were by this time in a position where their Far Eastern 
markets faced the possibility of being lost to Magadi Soda. In 1921 
the Magadi Soda Company's selling agents in Japan had formed a subsidiary 
company to deal with the increased volume of trade in Magadi Soda, called 
"Sun-Soda Co", which reported that Magadi ash was very well received on 
the Japanese market. The Annual Report of Magadi however, in 1922 
encapsulated their dilerrma: '... It is necessary that we should have suf-
ficient production to enable us to sell to the largest markets, where 
prices are high, and by this means force our competitors to reduce their 
price in the home market for the benefit of the consumer and British 
102 
industry. For this reason we shall have to raise further capital'. 
Despite the bright prospects for Magadi Soda production on the world 
market, the company was unable to raise the capital required to finance 
100. For further details on the significance and effects of currency 
conversion See, Macgregor Ross, op.cit, chapters one and two. 
101. In 1918, Lever Brothers were buying raw soda @ £5 per ton at 
Kilindini, Mombasa. Lever Brothers were closely associated through 
shareholding, with Brunner Mond. 
102. M.F. Hill, op.cit.. p. 79. 
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any expansions of the plant, and in February 1923, the directors gave 
103 notice to their bankers that it was impractical to carry on business. 
In the meantime a scheme was mounted for the reconstruction 
of the company, and an agreement was reached between two directors of the 
former company to take steps to carry through this oroposed scheme. However, 
Magadi's chief competitor for the world soda market, Brunner Mond, expressed 
a strong interest in controlling the company and they were thereupon granted 
facilities to investigate the company's annual accounts. This move was 
opposed and the Secretary of State for the Colonies, J.H. Thomas, blocked 
these moves by Brunner Mond to gain control of the equity of Magadi Soda 
Company. The bureaucracy was opposed to the formation of a cartel 
whereby Brunner Mond would secure a virtual monopoly of the soda ash 
trade in the Far East, and they were also concerned that the company once 
it gained control of the Kenyan soda deposits, would fail to develop 
them to their full capacity. The Colonial Office, for once acting in 
response to the colonial administrators in Kenya, refused to accept a 
plan for Brunner Mond to meet the Magadi Soda Company's liabilities. 
This initial failure to gain control of the Magadi Soda Company 
did not deter the Brunner Mond Company. In July 1924, they sent a 
technical mission to the Magadi site to examine and report on every 
aspect of production; this committee undertook a fair amount of informal 
lobbying of the Kenyan colonial administration and reported on return 
that the Governor seemed well disposed towards the new company and anxious 
to help in any way. The colonial administration had by this time reached 
the conclusion that it was better to accept the terms of a monopoly 
producer than risk the complete non-development of the soda deposit, which 
was providing some revenue through royalty payments. After much bargaining 
and negotiation on behalf of the Brunner Mond concern and the Colonial 
Office, the company was given permission to buy out the share capital of 
the former Magadi Soda Company at the beginning of 1925, and yet another 
Magadi Soda Company was constituted in London in December 1924. 
c) Monopoly Production and Amalgamation of Chemical Firms: 
From 1925, Brunner Mond were able to reinforce the ailing 
enterprise in Magadi with their technical and commercial knowledge of the 
soda business. Brunner Mond had finally achieved its objective of absorbing 
its chief competitor in the soda ash trade, and now Magadi soda was 
marketed in co-operation with Brunner Monds own ammonium soda products. 
103. Ibid. , pp. 79-87. 
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Steps were taken to fully integrate Magadi production into the overall 
pattern of the Brunner Mond organisation; and all overseas selling 
apencies were cancelled (which the company's own marketing structure 
a s s i m i l a t e d ) , except for that of the Mitchell Cotts Company which continued 
to sell for the company in South Africa. Brunner Mond proceeded to 
instigate a programme of capital expenditure for the Magadi plant. 
Having traced the absorption of Magadi production into one of 
the world's largest soda manufacturers, we will now briefly explore the 
conditions in the chemical industry as a whole which gave rise to further 
amalgamation and concentration of production. In 1914 Britain had been 
dependant on Germany for many fine chemicals, dyes and dyestuffs, and the 
war encouraged British chemical firms to remedy the imbalance. It was 
therefore, in response to competition from the two great chemical combinations 
I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. in Germany, and Allied Chemicals du Pont in 
America, that the British chemical firms were compelled to unite. 
In 1926, after six months of negotiation between them, this led to the 
amalgamation of the four great British chemical enterprises: Brunner Mond & 
Co, Nobel Industries Ltd, the United Alkali Co. and British Dyestuffs 
Corporation, into the Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd., (TCI). 
Brunner Mond had begun in 1914 to manufacture synthetic nitrates 
and built up a market for manufactured soda products. Nobel Industries was 
predominantly a dye manufacturing concern. The United Alkali Co had been 
formed in 1890 as a result of a merger of no less than 41 chemical concerns 
around Widnes, and was engaged in making sodium carbonate by the Le Blanc 
Soda Process. The British Dyestuffs Corporation on the other hand represented 
the rebirth of the dyestuffs industry in Britain under the pressure of war-
time needs and it had been subsidized heavily by the state. In December 1926 
therefore the chemical giant I.C.I, was registered with an issued capital 
of £57,000,000. Sir A. Mond (the chairman of Brunner Mond) was chairman of 
the new company. Thus the Magadi Soda Company became an offshoot of a 
large industrial combine that was to become one of Britain's largest 
manufacturing concerns. 
d) Magadi under control of I.C.I. 
From 192 5, therefore the Magadi Soda Comoany was controlled by 
a chemical combine, which had ax its disposal a high level of technology. 
Much effort was put into overhauling Magadi's sales system, which was 
C'XiDletely re-organized in order to fit in with the global requirements of 
the large corporation. A strong sales promotion was undertaken by ICI for 
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Magadi ash, for its high quality at this time meant that the outlets were 
104 
limited. During the 1920's Jape , took the largest proportion of Magadi 
soda. ^ 
Table 19: National Shares of Soda Experts from Kenya Colony: 
Year Destination Quantity % 0f total Exports of Soda Ash 
(Tons) (Tons) 
1923 Britain 3 ,932 12% n.a. 
1923 Japan 15,619 49% 31,762 
1925 " 38,126 79% 48,306 
1927 " 44,500 79% 56,421 
1936 22,400 48% 46,549 
(Source: Colonial Trade Accounts, 1923-1936). 
However in 1929 the Secretary of ICI came to a depressing 
conclusion; "... an indefinite prolongation of present methods of soda ash 
production would yield very little, if any, regular profit .... Magadi is 
approaching a serious turning point, there will almost certainly be a very 
much reduced carry forward into 1930, and it will be necessary from then on, 
until a new process is accomplished, to employ every means to prevent 
105 
accumulation of arrears". The years of depression hit the company hard. 
In 1930 Kenya's domestic exports we^e valued at £3,422 ,571, and by 1934 they 
had fallen to £1,909,876. By 1930 output had fallen to 44,479 tons which 
was less than the 1927 figure, (see table). ICI had considered the methods 
of production at Magadi Lo be unsatisfactory and had since 1925 been 
experimenting with a r.c , method of pui.'.xying Magadi ash. The bicarbonation 
process proposed in 1925 was revived in 1927 and 1930. This new process 
would involve a capital expenditure of between £150,000 and £400,000, and 
would result in an increase in costs from ten Shs. to fifteen Shs. per ton. 
Thus ICI, in the face cf the conditions of world production were 
faced with three alternatives: either they could install this purification 
process which would mean that the company would lose an additional £32,000 
per annum over and above the prevailing loss of £48,000 (although it'might 
pay off in the future), or they could manufacture caustic soda in Japan, 
which would involve a capital investment of £600,000 and entail a serious 
lOo risk of failure. " The final option was to close down the Magadi plant. 
104. Magadi soda -"^ h was a particularly high quality, which meant that 
it had a limited number of specific industrial uses, which were able to be 
more fully utilized after the Second World War. 
105. Annual General Meeting Report, 1929. 
106. The new process was essential to increase the output of the Magadi 
plant. The -.alcination costs of the raw scda had been very high before the 
advent of the new method. 
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This would entail abandoning the least on the plant, but it would also run 
the risk of competition gaining control of Magadi. It was finally decided 
by the shareholders in London that the company should carry on. The 
company incurred yearly losses between 1930 and 1937, which were due in 
part to the contraction of overseas markets on which Magadi relied for its 
exports. The company then embarked on a campaign to cut the costs of 
production. In 1933, a gas producer plant was proposed in place of oil 
fuel, and after the installation of this new plant the soda ash plant 
workei well. This saved considerably on calcinating costs, although it 
involved the use of more labour. An indication of the saving involved 
can be seen in the raw cost of soda ash at Magadi which fell from forty one 
point five Shs. per ton in 1930 to twenty three point six Shs. per ton in 
1936. In 1933, £5,000 had been allocated for the salt plant to produce rough 
salt for the domestic market, although the project was kept at a low level 
as the parent company did not wish to involve too much capital in a project 
that did not hold much potential in terms of sales. Ly 1938 the output of 
107 
salt at Magadi was only i+,570 tons. In 1939, a Board statement expressed 
the parent company's grim prospects for Magadi plant, '.... we have been 
brought to the conclusion that the Magadi enterprise, while still possessing 
a restricted value, can no longer be regarded as capable of providing an 
adequate re /ard for- the capital whi h has proved to h. ve been necessary for 108 its development ' 
However, despite gloomy predictions on the future of the Magadi 
Soda plant, world market forces were to boost its fortunes during the 
Second World War. Because of its geographical position, with supplies cut 
off from Europe, the company was able to expand its exports to India, South 
Africa, Australia and South America. The trade built up during these years 
since the war has not altered to this day,(except when exports to South 
Africa became impossible in 1963). 
Fran 1941 onwards production at Magadi increased rapidly to meet 
the expanding demand; and by 1945 over 6,000 tons of soda ash and 15,000 
tons of salt were produced. From this point onwards the demand for soda for 
industrial processes has never faltered, and sales have been restricted not 
by the incapacity of Magadi to produce enough soda to meet the demand, but 
rather because of the inability of the railways to cope with transporting 
307. Magadi at present still supplies all the domestic demand for 
rough grades of salt used for cooking, cattle licks, and also exports a 
small amount, mainly to neighbouring African countries. 
108. Magadi Soda Company, AGM, 1939. 
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the bulky commodity to the port at Mombasa. Between 1939 and 1961 
shipments from Magadi totalled more than 2,000,000 tons and the exports by 
1961 exceeded 150,000 tons per annum representing five percent of Kenyan 
109 
total domestic exports. Between 1929-1960 capital expenditure at Magadi 
amounted to £2,116,601, and of this £1,989,067 (94%) was spent after the 
Second World War between 194-5 and 1960. Not only did these years witness a 
marked improvement of technique, but by the 1960's, the plant had concentrated 
production and only one single grade was being produced (90% Na The 
lower grades, previously marketed in countries such as India, were disconti-
nued. A summary of the company's balance sheets since 1926 shows the rapid 
growth after the Second World War. 
Table 20: Annual Returns for Magadi Soda Company 1926-1970 
Year Issued Capital Net Assets Net Profit 
1926 597,141 1,108,102 (35,497) 
1930 597,141 1,131,701 (17,249) 
1940 737,095 1,084,728 17,203 
1950 796,260 1,379,459 186,540 
1960 977,754 1,514,028 366,558 
1970 2,727 ,933 3 ,289,341 410,957 
(Source: Annual returns, i Companies Registry). 
Only a large corporation with its concentrated resources was able 
to take advantage of the demand for this particular commodity after such a 
long period of market instability. This discussion has shown how the 
international corporation is able to keep sources of raw material under its 
control, even when the market forces are not particularly favourable to the 
commodity. 
109. Annual Reports of the Magadi Soda Company, (Companies' Registry). 
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PART V(c): THE TEA INDUSTRY AND BROOKE BOND IN KENYA. 
Introduction 
In the final detailed case study we will be concerned to show 
the way in which one particular firm, Brooke Bond was able to establish 
itself over a period of thirteen years from 1925 to 1938 as one of the two 
largest tea growers in Kenya, as well as the controller of the internal 
market. The attainment of this position is discussed and the international 
control mechanisms in the industry are analysed through the workings of the 
International Tea Committee (ITC). 
The Drive to Oligopoly: the Tea Industry 
a) The Entry of International Firms: 
In 1922 tea drinking was a 'luxury' confined to a small European 
and Asian population of Cast Africa. During 1925 and 1926, 99.6% of tea 
imports into East Africa came from India and Ceylon (see table 27). On top 
of the freight charges, an import duty of forty-five cts. per lb was imposed. 
The tea trade in East Africa before 1925 was therefore relatively small, and 
unless there was a prospect of initiating the majority African population 
into the habit of tea drinking, it would remain that way. 
There were several agents of the large metropolitan companies 
competing with each other to sell their respective teas in East Africa 
in the early 1920's. The two largest of these were Brooke Bonds and Liptons, 
although other smaller agencies existed such as that of the Twinings Tea 
Company. In 1916 Arthur Hirst of Nairobi was appointed from Calcutta as 
sole agent in East Africa for the sale and distribution of Brooke Bond teas. 
The idea was to open a branch of Brooke Bonds, for the parent company in 
Britain saw the possibility of extending their East African market by 
conducting vigorous sales campaigns to break the virtual monopoly held by 
Liptons. It was in response to these needs that a Brooke Bond branch was 
110 formally constituted in East Africa in 1922. 
The tea at this time was marketed, in two different forms, one 
in 'bulk' via Asian wholesalers and the other in 'packets'. The former was 
aimed chiefly at the African market which existed mainly in Zanzibar and 
the coast regions of Kenya and Tanganyika, but only a small proportion was 
110. Article, G.B. Pollard, (an employee of Brooke Bond in the 1930's). A 
Brief History of the East African Branch of Brooke Bond & Company (India) ltd, 
(from Brooke Bend Company files at Kericho). 
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finding its way to up-country markets in these two territories. However, 
the two importing companies, Brooke Bonds and Liptons dealt mainly with 
the packeted teas, which came directly from Ceylon and India and held only 
a small share in the bulk trade. The latter bulk teas were largely in the 
hands of Indian wholesalers importing from the country of origin, dava 
teas being particularly popular in the Zanzibar market. In the meantime 
Twinings had also entered the market and in 1922 made a shortlived attempt 
to challenge the Brooke Bond and Liptons hold over the import trade in 
tea to East Africa. It must be borne in mind that the actual size of the tea 
trade was small in the early 1920's, so there was strong competition for 
a share in a small cake. For instance, during the twelve months to 30/6/24 
Brooke Bond sales in East Africa were between 450,000 and 500,000 lbs and 
the total tea imports into the East African territories and Zanzibar was 
still under one million lbs. The closing sales of the Brooke Bond branch 
in 1925 were approximately 650,000 lbs, which represented about 60% of the 
total imports of tea, with a ratio of 70% in packets and 30% in bulk.111 
(see table 27). 
b) Tea Production in East Africa: 
Brooke Bond had only recently become a tea producing company as 
opposed to simply a tea dealer through the London auctions. Between 
1900-1914 Brooke Bond had set up branches for blending tea in India and 
Ceylon in order to be freed from dependence on the London market. The 
company extended into production in 1919 when the first Brooke Bond tea 
estate was purchased in Assam, and several more were bought in that year. 
A large distribution network was established in India just after the war, 
112 and a large number of already developed tea estates were absorbed. 
The market for tea in East Africa was small, and those engaged in 
the trade experienced strong competition from other distributors. From 
Brooke Bond's point of view this state of affairs coincided with the desire 
to diversify sources of production as the political climate in India was 
perceived by the company as being unreliable in the early 1920's. Although 
an important motive for producing in East Africa was to go behind the tariff 
wall and attempt to control compeition from other sources, the future 
export potential was another major consideration. For tea is primarily an 
export crop and the planting programmes of all the main producers were based 
lli: Pollard, Ibid. 
112- D- Wainwright, Brooke Bond, a Hundred Years, (a book published 
by the company in 1969), pp. 29-31. 
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on the assumption of finding a profitable market on the London auctions. 
These were the two main motives for the move of the two largest producing 
companies, James Finlay and Brooke Bond, into Kenya: to capture the local 
market and develop alternative producing areas. Both of these objectives 
were to be realised by Brooke Bond by 1938. 
These motives led to the acquisition of 1,000 acres at Limuru 
113 
in 1324 by the Brooke Bond company. At the same time the company made 
an arrangement with a number of farmers, who had been cultivating tea in 
the district on a smallholder basis, to buy their tea and process it in a 
central Brooke Bond factory at Mabroukie. Farmers in Kericho had similary 
been experimenting with tea growing since 1910. An agent of one of the 
James Finlay companies arrived in Kenya in 1925 at the same time as the 
Brooke Bond representative to discover that 25,000 acres of BEAD0C (British 
East Africa Disabled Officers Corporation) land in Kericho was for sale, 114 
as the Scheme had been a failure. Although the general manager was 
cautious from the point of view of the risk involved, 20,000 acres was 
purchased by the James Finlay Group (the largest tea growers in the world 
both in 1924 and at the present). The land was purchased from the 
Government for a paltry Shs.1193/- and a yearly rental on a 999 year lease 
of Shs.4000/-, and the James Finlay Company formed a private company 
registered in the United Kingdom, known as African Highlands Broduce 
115 
Company Ltd. Brooke Bond purchased the remaining portion (5,000 acres) 
and formed a private company known as the Kenya Tea Company Ltd. Brooke 
Bond gradually advanced its acreage by absorbing small planters' plots. 
Thus by 1926 tea development in Kenya was dominated by two large foreign 
companies, two locally owned public companies, Buret and Jamji and ten 
small private planters. By the outbreak of the war, the latter had been 
reduced to five from ten, and the total acreage under tea cultivation in 
Kenya had risen from 382 in 1924 to 12,662 in 1934. Between the same 
years tea production in Kenya rose from 1,341 lbs to 4,024,722 lbs, and 
exports from nil to 2,476,900 lbs in 1934, (See Table 27 and 30). Brooke 
Bond and African Highlands Produce Company, therefore, held the largest 
proportion of mature tea acreage before and after the Second World War. 
Unfortunately I do not have the precise acreage for Brooke Bond in the 
113. This information on land acquisition by Brooke Bond and African 
Highlands was acquired from the Lands Registry (Nairobi) as part of an 
examination of European estates which sold to foreign tea companies before 1960. 
114. The BEAD0C organisition had been set up after the First World War in 
order to assist the settlement of ex-officers. The scheme was a total failure 
and having unsuccessfully attempted the cultivation of both flax and coffee 
the Corporation had to sell the land in order to pay off their debts. 
See also MacGregor Ross op. cit. 
115. Lands Registry, op. cit. 
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1930's, although in 1934 African Highlands held 5,032 acres of tea in 
Kenya and the total area under tea ror that year was 12,662. I would esti-
mate from the Land's Registry accounts that Brooke Bond at this time had 
approximately the same acreage as African Highlands with around 5,000 acres; 
the balance of 2,662 acres or so being held by another foreign company, 
the Nandi Tea estates and the two local public firms, Buret and Jamji. By 
1943 the local firms had slightly increased their share of Kenyan tea 
acreage and a memo from the Department of Agriculture to the International 
Tea Committee, in November 1943, stated that the proportion of tea acreage 
held by 1) non residents and 2) residents in the Colony was 70% and 30% 
117 
respectively. As Brooke Bond and African Highlands dominated the non-
resident group it is justified to estimate that their percentage of total 
tea acreage in Kenya (which was 15,656 acres),, just before the end of the 
Second War was somewhere between 65% and 70%, which would leave these two 
foreign companies with approximately 10,959 acres between them in that year. 
By 1955 there were seventy-five licenced tea holders in Kenya, 
fifty-four in Uganda and twenty-five estates in Tanganyika. The size of 
118 
holdings ranged from 10,000 acres to less than 500 acres. By 1958, 
119 
Brooke Bond had 3,000 hectares of mature tea at Kericho having absorbed 
Jamji estate after the War, in 1946. Brooke Bond's consolidation of tea 
lands in the Kericho district was completed in 1971, with the acquisition 
of the only remaining large, locally owned tea estate, the Buret Tea Company 120 for which Brooke Bond paid £1,000,000. 
116. Information on acreage and production for the African Highlands 
Company was obtained from their office at Kericho. The Brooke Bond Company, 
unfortunately did not have similar figures reaching back before the Second 
World War. 
117. Kenya National Archives (KNA), 11/43. 
118. M.D. Mac William, The East African Tea Industry, 1920-1956, 
(M.Phil thesis, Nuffield College, Oxford, 1958), pp. 18-20. 
119. By 1955, Brooke Bond had invested a total of £6,000,000 in the 
tea industry in East Africa, (information from Head Office, Kericho). 
120. Interview with Brooke Bend in Nairobi, (February, 1974). 
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Of all the tea companies in East Africa after 1924 Brooke Bond 
121 was the only one with an established distributing organisation m Kenya. 
Brcoke Bond's policy in the years after 1924 was to make the local market 
its primary concern. Unfortunately for all the tea producers in East 
Africa, their production had begun to come on the market just at the 
onset of the Depression, when the London auction prices fell below those 
obtained on the local market. Therefore the larger estates, such as 
African Highlands and Brooke Bond, who would normally have exported their 
tea, turned to the local market as the most profitable outlet, and in 
1928 a period of intense competition began in response to these conditions. 
In June 1930 African Highlands sold tea for one Shilling per lb, ex-factory; 
however by 1931, both Brooke Bonds and Buret had dropped their prices of 
tea to 90 cts per lb, and African Highlands was compelled to follow suit. 
This cut-throat competition was having the effect of cutting the East 
African price level down to the London auction equivalent, which caused 
concern amongst the directors of the parent companies in Britain. In 1931, 
the government unexpectedly imposed a tea excise duty of ten cts per lb, 
but competition was so hot that none dared to pass on the increase to the 
consumer in East Africa.' Therefore the thoughts of the large companies 
turned to devising a more durable form of sales cooperation on the local 
market. 
In 1933, with the onset of the International Tea Restriction Scheme, 
Brooke Bond took the opportunity to exercise a determined bid for oligopolis-
tic price leadership and gradually raised their prices from eighty-five cts 
to One Sh. per lb. The other producers followed suit. Brooke Bond's share 
of the market never fell below 50%. However, by 1935, the prices on the 
world tea market had improved, as London auction prices had risen consider-
ably, thus relieving the pressure on the large tea companies to unload on 
122 the local market. 
Kenya had not been included in the first Tea Restriction Scheme 
from 1934-1938, but when the scheme came up for renewal, it was expected 
that East Africa would be included as it was anticipated that production 
would have increased faster than local consumption, and producers would be 
increasingly forced to export. It became imperative, therefore, to work out 
some kind of sales agreement before that time. The general form that such 
a scheme would take was clear: a quota share of the local market for each 
121. Pollard, op. cit. 
122. MacWilliam, op. cit., pp. 84-88. 
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producer, based on production and acreage, with an administrative body to 
run the scheme. However the conflict of interests between the producers o 
was to delay the conclusion of the agreement for three years. 
The negotiations during these years were almost exclusively 
between the two largest tea producers, both subsidiaries of British based 
companies. Brooke Bond wanted to become agents for the cooperative marketing 
organisation, retaining full control over detailed sales policy; for anj? 
proportionate share out of marketing in the internal market on a basis 
of production shares would mean this ccmpany sacrificing about 40% of its 
share of the market. Brooke Bond could probably have defended its hold on 
the internal market by pushing out the smaller producers, as the company had 
such a superior sales organisation, but it would not be so easy to dislodge 
the African Highlands Company, with its strong overseas backing. The affect 
of restriction would be to force tea on to the local market.once again and 
without cooperation all other producers could combine against Brooke Bond. 
Therefore Brooke Bond had strong reasons for either going into a suitable 
joint selling agreement or to forsake restrictions on exports. Their global 
activities required international restriction of sales so the pressures for 
a local agreement were overwhelming. 
However, the James Finlay Company wanted a fully owned producers' 
organisation and they fought for two years with Brooke Bond to achieve this, 
for this arrangement would mean Brooke Bond relinquishing its predominant 
hold over tea sales on the local market. Brooke Bond's emphasis has always 
been on the distribution rather than the growing of tea (the opposite of 
Finlay's), so the principle of apportioning sales in proportion to production 
was damaging. James Finlay also wanted revisions in Brooke Bond's original 
proposals to make provisions for a selling organisation to have a neutral 
trade mark. This would again amount to the fact that Brooke Bond if it 
accepted the arrangement, would have to give up their dominant distributing 
interests in East Africa, which they considered was too high a price to pay 
for cooperation. 
Finally, after discussions in London in October 1937, James 
Finlay Company prepared a memo outlining the scheme for the cooperative 
selling of tea accepting all the fundamental points that Brooke Bond had 
pressed for originally. This move had been instigated by changing world 
conditions of tea production. Previously, the main incentive for consideriiv 
a joint selling scheme had been that under full participation in the 
Restriction Scheme, East Africa would have reduced its exports considerably 
so that a large proportion of local production would have to be sold in the 
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East African market. However, when East Africa was accorded favourable 
terms for export restriction, the situation changed to such an extent that 
if the full export quota were taken up there might even be a shortage on the 
local market and export prices were higher than local prices. In other 
words producers might be more interested in a minimum rather than maximum 
quota for the local market. Therefore, from the point of view of Finlnys, 
who administered the sales to the local market it was no longer so important. 
An amendment to the Finlay's memorandum was passed at an Annual General Meetin; 
of the Kenya Tea Growers' Association in April 1938, and a limitation of 
123 
members' contributions to 30% of their production was passed. v Finally, 
in June 1938 approval was given to the scheme, which came into operation 
in September. In effect Brooke Bond became the East African Tea Growers 
Association (EATGA) representatives, and the main features of this contro-
versial scheme were as follows: 
1) Producers were to pay the transport costs of tea from their factory 
to the packing factory of the distributors. 
2) The distributors (Brooke Bond) for their part undertook to supply all 
the necessary financial and sales organisation and ust their goodwill, trade 
marks, and trade patents, although the tea packets would also indicate 
that the tea was from the 'EATGA'. In return for their services the 
distributors were to receive a commission of seven and a half percent from 
the gross selling proceeds of the tea which they handled. They were also 
entitled to deduct from gross selling proceeds some direct charges:- sub-
agents commission, all transport charges, all packing costs (including 
labour); materials and general upkeep. The scheme also provided for an 
advisory committee of producers in the three East African territories, to 
decide on the quantity of tea in individual quotas and settle any disputes 
that might arise. 
At the beginning of 1938 there were eight producers within the 
East African Customs Union marketing branded tea. In addition there were 
several brands in existence for a very localised distribution, packed either 
by small growers or bazaar firms that bought teas. All these were to be 124 
absorbed under the pool agreement in Kenya. Ambangulu Estate in Tanganyi 
joined the pool from the start, and the Ugandan estates were to join later. 
The proportionate share in this tea trade was as follows:-
123. Ibid, p. 89. 
12U. This marketing arrangement meant that Brooke Bond could 'pool1 
most East African teas, thereby controlling the profits from the marketing 
of such tea internally. 
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Table 21: Total Tea Sales in 1937 in East Africa 
Divided amongst: Kenya Teas LBS 
Brooke Bond 1,250,000 56% 
Buret 300,000 13% 
African Highlands 250,000 11% 
Jamji s 
Kapkorech 50,000 2% 
1,850,000 82% 
Uganda Teas Buchanans 150,000 7% 
Uganda Co 75,000 3 % 
Miscellaneous 25,000 1% 
250,000 11% 
Tang Teas Ambangulu 
Miscellaneous 
125,000 
25,000 
5% 
150,000 7% = 
TOTAL 2,250,000 lbs • 
(Source: Brooke Bond Memo, 1937). 
The advent of the pool reduced tho main brands to four 5 covering 80% of 
the tea trade in East Africa. This meant that within sixteen years of 
establishing its trading organisation in East Africa, Brooke Bond had managed 
to manoeuvre itself into a dominant position, both as far as the growing and 
marketing of tea was concerned. Most of the profit that Brooke Bond was to 
make in subsequent years was derived from its position of control over the 
internal marketing of tea in Kenya, a position which the company retains to 
this day. 
d) The International Tea Committee and the International Corporation; 
It is now necessary to show how the international aspects of tea 
production determined the policy of the big tea companies such as James 
Finlay and Brooke Bond towards the tea industry in East Africa. We will 
concentrate on the methods used by local and foreign capital to pursue 
their respective goals. 
Large companies are not merely concerned to 'carve an enclave' 
out of a particular production area, but are rather concerned to regulate 
and control conditions of production of that commodity world-wide, which is 
part of the mechanism of concentration of capital. 
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The James Finlay group, based in Scotland since the 1760's, built 
its empire on textile manufacture and trading, and in the nineteenth century 
12 5 
they acquired large tea estates in India, Ceylon and Java. ~ Ey the 1920's 
this group was the largest single grower of tea in the world. Brooke Bond 
and Company on the other hand were largely concerned with tea trading in the 
19th century, which involved buying up tea in India and Ceylon and selling 
it on the London auction, as well as distributing bought teas under their 
famous brand name. Even after they had invested in estates in India in 
the early 1900's, their1 main interest remained in the sphere of tea 
marketing and distribution. 
The idea of restricting tea production and acreage was first 
mooted in 1920, as it was felt by the world's largest tea producers that if 
tea production was not regulated then the industry might face serious over-
production in the years to come. It was after two abortive attempts at tea 
restriction in 1920 and 1930 that the first International Tea Agreement 
came into force in February 1933, when it was signed by the representatives 
of the tea industry in India, Ceylon, and Indonesia. Unlike the earlier 
attempts at restriction, the International Tea Agreement (ITA) was binding 
on all tea producers and backed by legislation of the respective government: 
The combination of over-supply of tea world wide and the Depression had 
reduced prices well below the previous averages for producers in these 
countries. This gave cause for concern to the largest producers of tea who 
laid out the conditions of the Tea Restriction Scheme as follows:-
1) Tea exports should be regulated in order to restore the equilibrium 
between supply and demand; 
2) That governments of the producing areas should undertake to prohibit 
exports in excess of the agreed quotas; 
3) That the basis for regulation should be maximum exports reached by each 
country between the years 1929 and 1931; 
4) No new planting should take place and seed exports to non participating 
12 0 countries be prohibited. 
It was an important feature of the Tea Restriction Scheme that, 
although other governments of tea producing areas such as East Africa were 
not signatories to the agreement, its successful implementation depended on 
their active participation. New entrants were tc be prevented, for the 
restriction scheme was designed to rescue the existing plantations in the 
old established tea producing areas. The purpose of the ITC's policy 
125. James Finlay & Company, 1760-1960, (a book prepared by the compar 
in 1963}. 
126. International Tea Committee Reports, 1945, (KNA 12/MAWR). 
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towards East Africa was to keep the industry as insignificant as 
possible. It was thought particularly important that the new tea growing 
areas of the British Empire should join since the 'well-being of the whole 
industry' was at stake. 
Initially;, the Kenya government meekly referred the ITC scheme to 
the Kenya tea Growers' Association (KTGA) for its opinion, and since this 
body was dominated by the two companies with large interests in Ceylon and 
India it world be expected to take a favourable attitude towards restriction-
The dominance of large producers in the ITC was epitomised by the top 
personnel in the organisation: the chairman of the ITC which was set up 
to administer the scheme, was also the chairman of the James Finlay holding 
company of African Highlands Produce in Kericho. It was hardly surprising 
therefore that the two large companies which dominated the KTGA were to 
accept the terms of the scheme on behalf of the other growers, (although 
some important modifications were suggested for its application to East 
Africa). There was to be no restriction on exports from East Africa but 
Kenya growers would cease all development, providing that those growers who 
had just started development wf>r» =Uo,<cj lu complete economic units. The 
following formula was suggested: that planters who had one hundred acres 
or more of tea and who had the means of disposing of their leaf to larger 
factories should be allowed to extend to a minimum economic area of 500 acres, 
including a fully equipped factory. Also that small estates and individual 
growers send their leaf to a central factory and could enlarge their areas 
to a maximum of one hundred acres each. This would ensure that many small 
growers would not go out of business; but more important it was because the 
large companies at this stage were quite dependent on small European growers' 
tea for throughput for their factories. Regulation based on standard 
exports was clearly impractical for East Africa, for the immaturity of the 
tea left no proper basis for calculation. 
The governors of Tanganyika and Uganda held different views from 
those of the KTGA. Indeed the administrations of all three territories 
faced a dileirma-acceptance of ITC regulations meant sacrificing the 'economic 
development' of the colony. As we have pointed out, the local administration 
in the territories usually took the side of the settlers in that they wished 
to develop industries in those countries, thus taking an 'economic nationalist' 
position. Indeed, this position was articulated in the Governors' 
Conference held in October 1933 where it was resolved: 
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"The East African Governments feel bound to develop such East 
frican industries as arc possible within their territories but recognise 
that it is undesirable for increased production in East Africa to militate 
against the policy of tea export regulations adopted by Ceylon, India, and 
127 the Dutch East Indies". 
The conditions of this first ITC Agreement were finally accepted 
and the governments' attitude here can be seen as that of resignation; 
however their opposition to the ITC regulations was to harden considerably, 
in direct response to political pressure from the settlers who represented 
the 'small* local tea growers. 
Under existing plans (without restriction), planned increases in 
acreage were: 
Table 22: Tea Acreages Under ITA Scheme 
Uganda Tanganyika Kenya Total • 
Existing acreages 
in 1933: 740 2500 12300-15,000 15,540-18,240 
Maximum increases 
until 1939 1260 2500 4000 7,760 
(without restriction): 
Whereas the Kenya Government, taking its cuc from the K GA at this 
point, were prepared to limit their expansion between 1933 and 1939 to 1,000 
acres, the other two governments, who reflected the interests of the. smaller 
producers, were not prepared to accept such a severe limitation. Meanwhile, 
in London, the ITC and large tea producing interests were lobbying the 
Secretary of State and in a memorandum urged speedy accession of East Africa 
...."We are already seeing increasing quantities of tea coming 
into world markets from these dependencies, and do not see why the producers 
of East Africa should ride on our backs to take advantage of a situation 
which is created by a scheme such as this; in fact we arc definitely of 
the opinion that only controlled production can save us from falling into 
a worse position than -we have already been in, and we consider that we have 12 8 
a claim on British connections to assist us in this matter". 
After three weeks the ITC accepted the KTGA amendment of freedom 
from export control, but at the same time took the view that the actual 
expansion of planting desired by the East African growers was 'extravagant' 
and contrasted the 33% exports proposed by East Africa with one half percent 
127. East African Governors' Conference, (cable to Colonial Office 
10/10/53, KNA). 
123. Macwilliam, op. cit., p. 90. 
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permitted by each of the regulating countries. The comparison was hardly 
meaningful since the figures involved for East Africa were so small and the 
area was fighting for the right to establish economic acreages. The Kenya 
Government who were at this point supporting the interests of the large 
companies, managed to persuade Uganda and Tanganyika to accept the economic 
acreage formula. As a result, Tanganyika had to abandon development plant 
in the Usambaras and come down to 2,900 aces from 8,640, Uganda was brought 
12 9 down from 2,900 to 2,000 acres, and Kenya remained at 1,000 until 1939. 
e) The Second Agreement, 1938-43: 
It was decided in 1938 that the Restriction Scheme should be 
renewed for a further five years between 1938 and 1943.130 The agreement of 
main participants was secured, and the attention of the large producers then 
turned to East Africa, the formal approach being made through the African 
Tea Association in 1936. When the question of renewal was discussed by 
KTGA, the chairman of African Highlands Produce (the James Finlay company) • 
predictably took the line of the parent company and proposed unqualified 
acceptance of the scheme, on the grounds that African tea growers had bene-
fitted very materially from the higher tea prices realised as a direct 
result of the ITA scheme under which the regulating companies were bearing a 
•heavy burden'. In other words, the larger producers, notably Brooke Bond and 
James Finlay, who dominated the ITC, wanted to restrict exports from the 
new tea areas such as East Africa and encourage the growers.to sell an 
increasing percentage of tea on the local market in order to keep prices 
up on the international market, a strategy which would serve their global 
interests in the long run. This plan of the large tea producers led to 
a revolt from the smaller tea growers in Kenya: those who had no interests 
outside East Africa and who were dependent on expanding their acreages and 
exported tea from East Africa alone. This group wera tired of being 
coerced into accepting measures detrimental to their own interests by the 
large producing companies and they proposed a contrary resolution on the 
Second Tea Agreement at the KTGA Meeting: 
''.... This Association, having already agreed voluntarily to 
complete restriction as regards the opening up of new areas, conditional 
on a like cessation of planting being observed throughout the African 
territories, is not prepared to undertake further participation in the new 
131 scheme in respect of regulation of exports." 
129. ITC Report, 1945, op.cit. 
130. Ibid. 
131. KTGA Annual Reports, 11/36, (Kericho). 
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It was claimed by the smaller producers that the young industry 
in East Africa had already made considerable sacrifices both as regards 
its own interests and those of the Colony. The industry, they claimed, 
was only just beginning to pay its way and had borne considerable costs 
in developing the internal market to lessen dependence on exports. This 
resolution was strongly carried by the KTGA members (who voted individually 
and not according to size of holding). The small producers, who were 
entirely reliant on their East African holdings, had assorted their dis-
approval of foreign capital dictating the 'rules of the game' to them, in 
so far as tea production in East Africa was concerned. In response to this 
pressure, the ITC suggested restricting exports to 90% (instead of 80%) 
of potential tea yields each year; but even this was considered unfair by 
the small producers. The ITC 'cartel' of big producers presented this to 
the KTGA as the only possible alternative, and the KTGA were pressured to 
accept the clause. However the Uganda and Tanganyika governments 
(representing producers outside the 'cartel'), refused point blank to 
accept the kind of export regulation imposed by the ITC on the KTGA, 
and when negotiations were re-opened with the ITC over the issue, the Kenya 
government also took a more positive stand in support of the smaller Kenyan 
tea growers. 
The Kenya government, therefore, having joined in the re-negotiation 
of the terms of the Second Agreement, took a 'nationalist' position in 
defence of the small Kenyan tea growers nnd began by attacking the KTGA's 
failure even to apply for the allotment for new planting to which Kenya had 
been entitled under the last agreement, a move which had been at the expense 
of the small tea growers. The Acting Colonial Secretary (Kenya) sent the 
following memo to the Governors1 Conference in November 1937, which encapsul-
ated their position: 
"... There is the separate question of the development of the 
colony as a whole in the interests of its inhabitants, as distinct from the 
development of an industry by companies whose major activities lie outside 
the colony, and on whose interests a small extension of areas of planting 
in Kenya will have little or no effect ....Tea is now known to 
have been an economic crop in certain areas where it had not proved itself 
in 1934, whereas other crops have proved a failure in places where there-
is good reason to expect that tea would afford certain planters a living 
which they can gain from no other branch of agriculture. Several applications 
have been made recently by persons who desire to plant tea in suitable areas 
which have failed to respond to development under other crops (e.g. Nandi 
- 76 - IDS/-rP 267 
and Kaimosi districts) and the government desires in the interests of the 
132 colony to s lpport these applications". 
It may seem surprising that the Kenya Government should so suddenly 
involve itself so actively in the ITC regulations and their affect on Kenya, 
after such a passive acceptance of the first Agreement. This action was 
largely in response to pressure from the farmers of the Colony, who dominated 
the Legislative Assembly, and in many cases dictated policy to the local 
administration. Many small farmers during the 1930's had experienced a 
series of crop failures, leaving them with only one alternative in certain 
areas: to go into tea production. By the late 1930's, therefore, the 
Colonial Government in Kenya had received a large number of petitions from 
planters' associations requesting that they should be allowed to switch 
133 
from unprofitable coffee to tea planting. The Kaimosi soldier settlers, 
for instance, had been allocated their farms after the First World War 
specifically for coffee growing, but the district proved unsuitable for 
both coffee and flax. The North Sotik farmers also asked for 1000 acres, 
the Nandi Planters Association for 3000 acres, and altogether these 
associations applied for 8,290 acres for new tea planting. After examining 
these claims, the Kenya government resolved to apply for 2,220 acres for 
allotment to new entrants, but they had no hope of support from the KTGA, 
whore the interests of the large companies was paramount. Kenya, along with 
Tanganyika and Uganda, now refused to sign the agreement for East Africa, 
and the ITC had to consider granting some minor concessions by allowing 
exteations of tea acreages within the following limits: 
Table 23: Acreages Under Second ITA: 
Uganda Tanganyika Kenya Nyasaland Total 
Original Proposal: 500 1400 500 100 2,700 
After Negotiations:1000 1400 1300 100 3,800 
(Source: ITC Report 1945). 
However, these acreages applied only to extensions of existing tea and not 
new planting for which the East African governments had been pressing. The 
farming group in Kenya, however, had a powerful influence over internal 
policy-making in the colony. In a debate in the Legislative Assembly (LEGCO) 
in December 1937, this class made its position clear: they would strongly 
©ppose the renewal of the Tea Ordinance unless those fanners in unsuccessful 
13U coffee areas vere peaanitted to turn to tea growing. 
132. Department of Agriculture to the Hon. Chief Secretary, Nairobi 
(KNA, AGR 10/39, Volume ?). 
133. Memo from Dept. of Agriculture to the ITC, (11/43, KNA). 
134. Among the settler, tea growing lobby in LEGCO was Lord Francis 
Scott who had extensive tea interests in Tanganyika. 
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The ITCj who were becoming irritated by the delaying tactics of 
the East African governments and their constitutents, finally agreed to 
grant an additional increment of 1,300 acres for new plantflig in East 
Africa as a whole. Under the terms of the new agreement new planting was 
to be spread over five years and allocations had to be made in economic 
units for factory organisation. In return for this concession, however, the 
ITC felt justified in exacting a quid pro quo in the form of an 
propaganda cess (the proportion established being two Shs. per lb of made 
tea). Of course the main beneficiaries of this cess would be those large 
companies, notably Brooke Bond, who controlled the international tea 
marketing. In East Africa,, for instance, this cess was used to encourage 
local consumption of tea, as the large companies wanted not only to see the 
expansion of the local market but also to keep tea away from the international 
market while prices were low. 
f) Wartime Conditions and Renewal of ITA: 
One might have assumed that the transformed wartime situation, 
with the loss of several Far Eastern tea producers such as Indonesia, Burma 
and Japan, would have automatically led to the abandonment of tea restriction. 
However, the ITC resolved to the contrary to recommend,. 'to the governments 
and producers concerned that the existing agreement should be continued as 
135 
it stands for the duration of the hostilities'. Furthermore ITC's concern 
over the loss of continental markets led them to lower the export quota by 
five percent. 
As we have seen, the last ITC agreement had provoked considerable 
opposition from the small producers within the KTGA. When the ITC directive 
on renewal of the restriction scheme was considered tho following resolution 
was passed:-
' ... That this association must decline to participate in any 
13 6 further renewal of the restriction scheme' . 
Concurrently, the local Kenya administration were launching an attack on the 
ITC scheme as it affected East Africa in their bid to defend the Kenyan 
industry as a whole. 
' ... Certain members of the KTGA feel that in view of the New 
Colonial Development Policy, the question of restricting planting of tea in 
137 this colony should be reconsidered'. 
135. Letter from ITC to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1/1/42, 
KNA, AGR 4/12, MAWR 3). 
136. Minutes of KTGA, 13/7/43, (Kericho). 
137. Ibid. 
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Furthermore, the Director of Agriculture (Kenya) in a memo to the Chief 
Secretary asserted in defence of the 'small' element of the KTGA: 
"It may be advisable to record the reservation that this 
government feels: that the restriction scheme involves a disproportionate 
sacrifice on the part of the new and more productive areas such as East 
Africa, which would otherwise be in a position to exploit their comparative 
advantage. In this connection, though the scheme has doubtless done some-
thing to stabilised prices, it would be a fallacy to ascribe the improve-
138 
ments in the tea market wholly to restriction..." 
The Director of Agricultura, in commenting at the end of this memo, expressed 
the feeling of the Kenyan administration about its position on the ITC: 
...."The powers of the East African votes on the ITC would appear to be 
limited". 
The position held by the local administration was that the 
interests of Ceylon and India had fostered the agreement, and subsequent 
renewals had been simply to maintain uneconomic estates in production at the 
expense of the East African producers, whose yields were two and three 
times higher than those of many Indian estates. A dialogue on the 
issue of renewal again developed between the Kenyan administration 
and the Colonial Office. The Kenyan administration asserted that although 
they valued some forms of conmodity controls, it was not the government's 
opinion that the tea scheme should be retained as a model of post war 
development, a line which the Colonial Office were pursuing. The ITC 
thought in best to avoid the storm that was brewing with 'local' interests 
and they decided to offer East Africa new planting up to a maximum of twenty 
140 
percent of the permitted acreage allowance, and, after some argument, 
they also agreed to permit the unplanted balance from previous allocations 
to bo carried over. After this skirmishing, the Kenya Government finally 
offered to extend the tea agreement for the duration of the war and six 
months after, providing an ellowance of 1000 acres per year was granted for 
new planting, either for existing or new planters, at the government's 
discretion. This total amounted to: 
133. Memo from Acting Director of Agriculture to Member for Agriculture 
18/10/46, (KMA, AGR 4/12, MAWR 3 AGR). 
139. Ibid. 
lu0. The advantage of new planting was that the estate would be 
permitted to expand its acreage and put in new jats, the rest of the 
acreage allowance was for infilling existing areas. 
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Table 24: 
Existing acres Extensions granted 
Kenya 16,162 3,232 
Uganda 4,716 943 
Tanganyika 7,450 4,040 
(Source: ITC Report, in KNA AGR 4/12). 
In Kenya, therefore, the government was still determined to en-
courage new entrants, (in response to the farming element in the LEGCO), 
141 
in spite of opposition from the paramount chiefs of the KTGA. The 
government further intervened in the interpretation of the ITC regulations 
and set up a committee to decide on the distribution of the allotment and 
ruled as follows: 
Table 25: ITC Allotments 
39% to go to New Growers 1,270 Acres 
30 " " Small " 955 
31 " " Large Tea estates 1,007. 
3,242 acres. 
(Source: Memo to ITC from Department of Agriculture 11/43) 
The two large firms in Kenya, African Highlands (James Finlay) and Kenya 
Tea Company (Brooke Bond), protested to the Secretary of State at the 
neglect by the Kenya Government of the claims of established interests, 
but this was to fall on deaf ears, for the Kenya Government had an 
additional motive for wishing to expand the industry at this time, apart 
from that of defending the small tea growers. A number of tea interests 
in India and Ceylon wanted to transfer their interests to East Africa dueto 
the political situation in those countries, and their general aim after the 
war was to diversify their areas of investment. 
of 
"During recent months a number/firms at present interested 
and connected with planting in India have sent representatives to the 
territories to investigate the possibilities of tea production in Kenya". 
Thus, taking up their nationalist positions once again, the governments of 
the three territories decided to defy the ITC and opt out of the agreement, 
and, at a meeting in January 1947 of the territorial governments, it was 
recommended "....That existing tea ordinances should be extended for another 
143 
year, but that all acreage restrictions should be removed forthwith'.1. 
The ITC interpreted these actions as 'hostile' and assumed that East 
Africa had withdrawn from the ITC. Accordingly, the ITC banned all seed 
141. KTGA Minutes, 13/7/43, op.cit. 
142. Memo from Ag. Dir. Agr. to HCS (10/46), op. cit. 
143. Conference of East African Governors, 1/47, (in MacWilliarn, 
op.cit.), p. 20. 
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exports to East Africa, a fact that was not to concern Kenya unduly. 
Cavendish Bentinck (a prominent settler member of LEGCO), wrote in 1947: 
'.... as regards the refusal of India to supply tea seed. I do 
not think that the East African industry will be very worried about this as 
you will see from the letter of the Director of Agriculture ... that we 
shall be able to obtain supplies of seed elsewhere'. ' 
The ITC was after the war under pressure on both the metropolitan 
and the local front. The ITC by 1947 had ceased to have the support of the 
Colonial office, (there had been a change of government in Britain), which 
was concerned that the ITC was contrary to the United Nations Charter on 
Commodities. Therefore, the ITC met in November 1947 to consider its 
future. They decided that the International Tea Agreement should be 
extended for a further two years after March 1948, or until the new UN 
Charter for the International Trade Organisation came into force. The 
Committee also decided that the export regulation powers should be retained, 
although no quotas would be in force for that time; and that all restrictions 
on new planting should be removed in the participating countries. The 
justifications of the ITA 'benefitting the whole industry' were subdued, 
and these tempered regulations showed that it no longer suited the purpose 
of the major producers to restrict expansion in the newer tea growing areas. 
In fact, as we have said, the conditions of nationalism in Ceylon and India 
after the war encouraged the dominant producers of tea, such as Brooke Bond 
and James Finlay, to expand their existing areas of production in Kenya. 
What had been the overall effects of the tea restriction scheme-
on different producing interests in East Africa? In November a question 
was asked in the House of Commons along these lines; whether tea 
planters in Kenya Colony are satisfied with existing opportunities for 
development and whether such development is affected by international 
145 control of the industry?". To which the Colonial Secretary replied: 
"the development of the tea industry in Kenya has not been adversely 
affected by the existence of the ITA since Kenya was allotted under that 
agreement new acreage and export quotas, neither of which has been fully 
achieved during the period of the agreement". 
144. Letter from Cavendish Bentinck (LEGCO) to Sir C. Lockhart, 
Conference of East African Governors, 1946, (KNA, MAWR 3AGP. 1/14). 
145. Hansard, Vol.393, p. 673, in MacWilliam, op. cit., p. 26. 
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It was indeed true that there really was no question of export control 
being restrictive. Under wartime conditions official policy had been to 
maximise production and quota figures, and the tea growers in Kenya in 
fact never fulfilled the maximum planting quotas. However, as was noted 
earlier, during the first ITA period frcm 1933-38, the KTGA delegates had 
failed to apply for the full amount of acreage for planting to which Kenya 
was entitled, and this had been a deliberate ploy on the part of the two 
large companies to keep the Kenyan industry insignificant. 
In the second Restriction Scheme the first two seasons were lost 
to many growers because of the seed restrictions. In addition, the war 
prevented many of the allotments being developed. For by the time the war 
was over for both large and small estates alike, land values and 
147 
development costs had risen two or three times. In the third period, the 
ITA did not restrict any of the licence holders, and much of the development 
which took place was on licences for the previous period. Only a very 
limited form of development took place during these years. 
Thus even the large companies in Kenya had been prevented altogethe 
from developing their properties beyond the 1933 level, and they had to 
watch a number of new planters enter the industry while their own acreages 
had been frozen. For example African Highlands, the James Finlay Company 
148 
in Kenya, had 5,032 acres of tea in 1934 and only 5,492 by 1950. Certain! 
from the point of view of East Africa as a whole, tho experience under the 
ITA conditions had not been favourable to the development of their national 
tea industries. 
Despite the ultimate affect of the ITA scheme on the industry 
in East Africa, it is obvious that the Kenya government was able to wring 
piecemeal ooncessions from the ITC concerning acreage allocations, and as we 
have seen these provided East Africa with larger acreage quotas than had 
been originally envisaged. The ITC for its part had constantly accused the 
East African territories of trying to 'exploit1 the advantages of the scheme 
without contributing to it or cooperating with the major producers. The 
chairman of the ITC, Sir Robert Graham, in reviewing the scheme, reflected 
the attitude of the large producing companies towards East Africa: 
146. Wartime conditions made not only finance for development a difficul 
conscription in East Africa for military service meant a shortage of 
adult male labour to service the estates. 
147. Information obtained from Head Office Kericho. 
148. African Highlands HQ at Kericho. 
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"....in passing it may be mentioned that an element which 
British representatives have always found embarrassing in their relations 
with their Dutch colleagues is the fact that British tea interests outside 
India and Ceylon have always betrayed a desire to take advantage of the 
scheme, and in this some of them have been supported by their local 
governments the difficulties experienced in respect of the East African 
territories and Malaya were all the more disappointing because British 
interests in tea predominated. A more sympathetic attitude to the scheme 
would have been expected".14^ 
Having detailed the conflicts between local and foreign capital 
in the attempts of the latter to control production, it is important to 
evaluate how the ITA was to affect the long term global interests of the 
large corporations. The ITC efforts to control production in the new tea 
producing areas would appear to have been successful, overall. India, 
Ceylon and Indonesia remained with a virtual monopoly of the black tea 
trade, and there was never any prospect of it being challenged, given 
immaturity of African tea. 
Table 26. World Black Tea Exports 1927-32, (million lbs). 
India, Ceylon and Indonesia 759.6 
Rest of the World 29.5 
Kenya 0.7 
(Source: V.D. Wickizer, Tea,'Coffee and Cocoa', Stanford 1951). 
Within East Africa it is true that the subsidiaries of the dominant tea 
producers, Brooke Bond and James Finlay, suffered adversely from the 
control on planting. However, from the point of view of the overall 
strategy of the parent companies it had been advantageous, as it prevented 
the e>qpansion of new areas until prices of tea had risen to their previous 
levels, which they did soon after the war. 
The immediate disadvantage that the Brooke Bond subsidiary in 
Kenya was to suffer during the restriction was soon compensated for by the 
expansion and consolidation of the Kenya company after the Second World War. 
The concentration of tea production in the large estate^, notably Brooke 
Bonds', gained momentum in the 1950's and their acreage was expanded by 
means of take-overs of small existing tea estates. For instance, Jamji 
Estate, which was owned by Lord Egerton, sold out to Brooke Bond in 1946. 
During the 1950's they built six new factories and there was a large extension 
in planting and investment in new techniques. In 1950 the total acreage 
under tea in Kenya was 18,383 and in 1955 25,072 acres, and of this Brooke Bond 
149. Macwilliam, op.cit, p. 26. 
150. Land Registry, op.cit. 
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accounted for 75-80%. With better methods of production from the late 
1950's (the use of herbicides , trough withering and Crushing, Tearing and 
Cutting (CTC) manufacture) and other new techniques, the productivity of 
these tea areas rose. For instance, African Highlands Produce Company in 
1945 were getting 859 lbs of made tea per acre and by 1965 this had risen 
151 
to 1289 lbs per acre and Brooke Bond's production rates were similar. 
Despite the stagnating effects of restriction, the natural economic advant-
ages of production in East Africa did inevitably lead to the expansion of 
the industry in Kenya, a process which itself was dominated by the large 
producers. 
The expansion of the dominant tea company in Kenya, Brooke Bond 
has only been curbed by the rise of African nationalism, and at the 
present time there is a complete embargo placed by the Treasury on the 
expansion of the company in terms of land expansion or company takeover. 
In 1964 estate tea production accounted for 60% of total production, and 
smallholder tea the other 40%. By 1974, the position had reversed exactly 
152 with smallholder production accounting for 60% of production," and with 
the present expansion plans of the KTDA (Kenya Tea Development Authority) 
153 
for another 20 factories in the next 7 years one could predict the phasing 
out of estate production. It remains to be seen whether the powers of the 
state will be used by the nationalists to challenge not only the expansion 
of the dominant tea company, Brooke Bond, but also the control vihich this 
company has exerted over the internal marketing of tea in Kenya since 1938. 
151. 
152. 
153. 
African Highlands HQ, Kericho. 
Tea Board of Kenya Reports (1974). 
Interview with KTDA in 1974. 
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Table 27: Kenya Tea Imports and Exports 
Exports £ Exports Cwts Imports £ Imports Cwts Tea Duty 
1926 61,127 6901 (1-) 
1927 85 9 69,659 7273 .45 
1928 736 91 91,087 9969 .45 
1929 871 83 73,508 8094 .45 
1930 8277 1433 34,798 3788 .40 
1931 16925 3184 11,621 1341 .50 
1932 29829 6369 1,832 204 . 50 
1933 78022 17731 1,539 172 . 50 
1934 113489 22362 1,639 170 • J50 
1935 218941 45446 2,097 231 .50 
1936 339777 67835 2 ,382 243 .50 
1937 474599 83197 2,739 291 .50 
1938 508060 85440 3,186 338 . 50 
1944 51262 8 82480 2 ,177 289 . 50 
1945 532447 85052 1,697 248 .50 
1946 534240 79920 37 1 1.0 
(Source: Colonial Trade accounts 1926-1946) 
Table 28: Internal consumption in Tea Producing Countries 
(million lbs) 
Country m.lbs Year % Year o. Year % Year % Year % 
1930 9.5 1933 % 1936 1939 1942 
India 37.4 9. 5 55.3 14 82. 5 21 97.6 21. 5 125 22 
Ceylon n. a. 4.7 2 8.2 4 10.4 4 10.2 4 
Kenya & 
Uganda n. a. .8 27 .8 9 .8 7 4.6 28 
Tanganyika .3 E .4 E .5 80 .5 38 
Japan 65.4 7.0 67.7 70 69.9 66 75.0 59 n. a. 
E. Consumption exceeds production. 
(Source: I.T.C. Pamphlet, 1946). 
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Table 29: Tea Acreage 1924-: 1954 
Kenya Uganda Tanganyika Total 
1921 382 118 
1925 1,689 159 
1926 3,156 188 
1927 4,809 194 
1928 5,593 297 
1929 8,331 342 
1930 10,052 360 
1931 11,258 639 
1932 12,034 721 
1933 12,471 1,267 
1934 12 ,662 1,691 2,739 17,092 
1935 12,812 1,930 3,343 18,085 
1936 13,176 2,629 4,403 20,208 
1937 13,662 2,886 5,225 21,773 
1938 13,681 2,966 5,265 21,912 
1939 13,993 3,199 5,276 22,468 
1940 14,413 3,524 5,681 22,618 
1941 14,208 4,071 5,991 24,270 
1942 15,313 4,423 6,302 26,038 
1943 15,656 4,458 6,451 26,565 
1944 15,712 4,528 6,819 27,059 
1945 16,037 4,615 5,814 26,466 
1946 16,239 4,525 6,808 27,572 
1947 16,548 5,121 7,748 29,417 
1948 17,100 5,656 8,313 31,069 
1949 17,765 6,150 8,650 32,565 
1950 18,883 6,630 9,022 34,535 
1951 19,873 7,321 10,000 37,194 
1952 21,021 7,798 10,493 39,312 
1953 21,753 8,397 10,517 40,667 
1954 23,406 9,323 10,860 43 ,589 
[Sources: From 1938 onwards the figures are from the Agricultural 
Department and were supplied by the Tea Controller until 1950, 
and after that date by the Tea Board of Kenya.) 
\ 
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Table 30 Tea Production, 1924 - 195;:-s 
lbs: Kenya Uganda Tang Total 
1924 1300 
1925 3,200 
1926 8,700 
1927 33,400 
1928 152,800 
1929 577,800 
1930 930,200 
1931 1,500,200 
1932 2,421,100 73,000 45,000 2,539,100 
1933 3,019,400 68,900 45,000 3,133,300 
1934 4,024,700 123,700 45,000 4,193,400 
1935 6,301,400 218,200 94,300 6,613,900 
1936 8,611,100 262,100 155,500 9,028,700 
1937 10,808,000 416,100 381,800 11,205,900 
193S 10,840,500 490,400 522,000 11,852,900 
1939 10,860,000 671,000 592,500 12,113,500 
1940 11,912,000 1,02.0,000 835,100 13,767,100 
1941 14,228,000 1,455,600 
1,928,600 
1,016,100 16,699,700 
1942 16,250,000 1,416,900 19,595,500 
1943 13,091,000 1,746,800 1,288,500 16,126,300 
1944 13,789,000 2,400,300 
2,847,000 
1,149,000 17,338,300 
1945 13,02.3,000 1,2.77,700 17,147,700 
1946 12,277,000 2,648,800 1,480,900 16,406,700 
1947 13,384,900 2,737,000 1,370,300 17,492,400 
1948 10,026,000 3,831,000 1,491,400 15,348,400 
1949 11,472,000 3,360,000 1,453,100 16,285,100 
1950 14,938,400 3,677;400 1,748,700 20,364,500 
1951 15,526,000 4,296,400 2,383,400 22,005,800 
1952 It.., 788,700 3,835,400 2,462,600 21,086,700 
1953 12,927,600 4,793,900 2,821,200 20,542,700 
1954 17,389,600 6,625,100 3,583,700 27,238,400 
( Sources: 1924-32 from tho Agricultural Census. 1933-49 are from the records 
of the Tea Controller. After 1950, Kenya Tea Board), 
Suranary and Conclusion; 
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This study has sought to expand upon some aspects of capitalist 
development in Kenya colony before the Second World War. The role of the 
metropolitan state in the development of the East African territories before tt: 
,.rar was limited to the provision of infrastructure for settlement. Metro— 
politan and local settler interests in the inter-war period were clearly 
divergent, with the former being concerned to utilise the colonial territory 
as a source of raw materials for its industries and also to prevent the 
emergence of any manufacturing in the colonies which would compete in metro-
politan and colonial markets with British goods. The settler class, on the 
other hand backed by the local administration were intent upon the develop-
ment of capitalist agriculture and secondary industries where a market 
existed. Therefore deveiornr. in Kenya was assisted by some central 
government1grants in old' .although it is true to say that most infrastru-
ctural development was financed largely by the local idministration through 
taxes which fell mainly on ohe r-on—European classes. This dichotomy between 
the different policies of the local .-and the central state have been stressed f 
the outset. 
Part 11 has outlined the nature of company formation in the colony 
before 1945 in order to show the areas of domestic accumulation in Kenya. 
The first pericd of company formation, from 1907 to 1922 has illustrated 
the limited scope of the first local investments, which tended to be restricte 
to the areas . of lard -id pr?porty, Companies formed after 1922 up to 1945 
show characteristics of expanding capitalist development, with an increase 
in the numbers of firms as well as scope of investment.. From the examination 
of companies formed in this period, the emergence of an Asian merchant class 
is evident, while any small scale manufacturing and engineering was undertaker 
by foreign firmso The local European firms, on the other hand Trove in somo 
cases involved in primary processing but the basis for accumulation of this 
group was the land and agriculture. This analysis concludes by posing the-
the ruestion of why European capital was too weak to survive competition from 
both Asian and foreign capital i:a the post—war period, 
The next section ;emprises an analysis of Kenya Colony's tariff 
structures and trading patterns before 1945. From 1922 the tariff structure 
in the colony reflected the desire ef tho settler class to protect local 
primary processing and agricultural industries. Manufactured goods were 
also subject to ouite a hi'gli lea el of duty :ca order to raise revenue for the 
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local state. The discussion of trading patterns in the colony shot's the 
level of import and export trade bet aen East Africa and the outside world. 
Hie significance of the trading patterns of the colony in the 1920*s and 
1930»s lies in the fact that Britain ras being adversely affected by competi-
tion .from new trading partners, aid particularly Japan. British manufac-
tured goods in particular were suffering competition from Japanese ecuivalents. 
The logical conclusion to this state of affairs fas for British trading firms 
to move directly into the production of a threatened commodity by going 
behind the tariff wall. This 'import substitution* mechanism was not to be 
fully realised until after 1945} although several examples of its operation 
before that time have been discussed, notably in the cases of tea and cement. 
The advent of international capital in Kenya Colony has been 
considered in Part IV. Here the major foreign investments made in Kenya 
before 1945 are broken down into three activity groupings? Food, Beverage 
and Estates, Trading^and Manufacturing and minerals. The ireas and type 
of foreign investment have been .hoTai in this way and the main concentration 
of foreign firms before the Second 'forId 'far was in primary processing and 
trading. '?hree case studies h ave been developed from each of the activity 
groups. It has been possible through this longer case study to expound on the 
competitive nature of capitalist development, and how this relates to pro-
duction in Kenya. The impetus behind the expansion of certain firms into the 
colony before tho Second World 'far 'as the need to control the conditions of 
production in that commodity? in this case tea, coffee, cotton seed and soda 
ash. The aim here is to show the -ay in which monopolies are established 
locally as part of an overall drive it the global level. The case of the 
Brooke Bond company is tho most extensive exposition of the three, of the 
methods used by international capit 1 to control the production of a commo-
dity idth reference to that company's global needs. 
This paper, therefore ha:< endeavoured to examine the often antago-
nistic relationship between local and foreign capital and the role of the 
colonial state in capitalist development. These examinations of local 
accumulation ;ind foreign investment have been examined largely from the 
perspeciivo of company formation aid the conclusion which emerges is that 
the scope of investment in manufacturing concerns before 1945 was fairly 
limited. This in itself "as 1 reflection of the limited markets in East 
Africa at the time, and also the desire of British industrial capital at 
that time to discourage .any manufacturing for export which would potentially 
threaten its ovti markets. These factors resulted in the accumulation of 
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merchant but not industrial capital in the colony before the Second War, 
although the pressure of competition on British firms before was making 
itself felt- ": •; ... 
The Trading firms that entered the colony were to compete in 
limited although potentially expanding markets, and the response of individual 
firms was to move from trading in commodities in to direct production. 
Changes in worldwide economic conditions after the Second World War occasioned 
the transformation of metropolitan merchant capital into industrial capital. 
This was to cause Britain to totally change her policy regarding the colonial 
territories due to the altered needs of British industrial capital, which 
was to expand markets in the sterling area as ciuickly as possible. Thus 
after 1945 there emerged a 'development policy' towards the colonies which 
was designed not only to increase agricultural production but also to develop 
secondary industries. This was clearly a radical departure from the 
inter—war period dealt with in this paper when the needs of British industrial 
capital were best served by extraction of raw materials but the curbing of 
any potential export industries. 
154. This was in order to reduce dollar deficits incurred by 
Britain during the war. 
